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NOTES
Constitutional Law-Debtor-Creditor Relations-Fuentes v. Shevin:
Due Process for Debtors
In most states prior to June 12, 1972,' any person could avail
himself of a statutory summary procedure known variously as "re-
plevin,' '2 "claim and delivery, ' 3 "detinue," 4 and "sequestration" 5 to
seize property in the hands of another by the simple expedient of alleg-
ing a right to possession and posting bond. A writ of possession would
issue, usually conditioned upon the claimant's initiating a later court
action to determine the rights of the respective parties to the property. 6
A defendant's bond provision was available in most states to enable the
defendant to recover the disputed property pending the outcome of
litigation on the issue of right to possession.7 There was, however, no
notice and no opportunity for the dispossessed party to challenge the
claimant's right to possession before seizure of the property.'
These summary prejudgment replevin statutes have had a long and
curious history. One of their ancestors was the writ of replevin, devel-
oped in England over 700 years ago to correct abuses that accompanied
the widespread use of "distress," a self-help device by means of which
a powerful creditor (usually a feudal baron) appropriated chattels of a
debtor (usually his tenant) to compel payment of a debt of money or
service. Replevin permitted the alleged debtor to recover his property
pending adjudication of the underlying dispute. The writ of replevin was
thus, at early common law, a remedy for the debtor, rather than for the
creditor. I"
'This was the date the Supreme Court's decision in Fuentes v. Shevin was handed down. 92
S. Ct. 1983 (1972).
'See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 119, §§ 1-27 (Smith-Hurd 1954).
'See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 565.01-.11 (1947).
'See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-586 to -595 (1957).
'See, e.g., TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 6840, 6844-48, 6858 (1960).
'See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-518 (1960).
'See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 514 (West 1954).
'The National Legal Aid and Defender Association, in its Amicus Curiae Brief for Fuentes
v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972), undertook a comprehensive survey of the prejudgment replevin
statutes of all the states. The results are tabulated in Appendix A of the brief. Typical replevin
procedures are described in greater detail in Comment, Laprease and Fuentes: Replevin Reconsi-
dered, 71 COLUN. L. REV. 886, 888-90 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Replevin Reconsidered].
'J. COBBEY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF REPLEVIN 1, 22-23 (1890).
"Replevin Reconsidered 887; see Abbott & Peters, Fuentes v. Shevin: A Narrative of Federal
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Another ancient ancestor of the modern statutes was the writ of
detinue. This remedy differed from replevin in that detinue was used
where chattels were wrongfully withheld, rather than wrongfully taken. I
Further, there was no recovery of the property by the plaintiff until final
adjudication. The defendant was rather commanded to appear and show
why the property should not be delivered to the plaintiff.'
The modern replevin statutes were a merger of aspects of both
writs, providing the prejudgment recovery of the property whether al-
leged to have been wrongfully taken in the first instance or only wrong-
fully withheld. 3 The modern statutes have become a creditor's rem-
edy, 4 used typically by a secured seller of goods summarily to recover
his merchandise upon default of payments by the purchaser.
Until recently, there had been notable absence of constitutional
challenge to these time-honored procedures. 15 But in 1969, a landmark
decision, Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,6 cast considerable doubt
on the constitutionality of summary prejudgment creditors' remedies.
Sniadach involved a Wisconsin wage garnishment statute17 which per-
mitted a general creditor to garnish the wages of anyone he claimed was
indebted to him by having summons issued pursuant to an action to
adjudicate the debt and paying a token clerk's fee and suit tax. The
Supreme Court held that in "extraordinary situations" such a procedure
might be constitutional,"8 but absent such circumstances procedural due
process was not met where one's wages were frozen without notice and
an opportunity to be heard. 9 Mr. Justice Harlan, in a separate concur-
Test Litigation in the Legal Services Program, 57 IOWA L. REv. 955, 963 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Abbott & Peters].
"Replevin Reconsidered 888.
"
2Brief for Appellant at 15, Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972); Abbott & Peters 164.
13Brief for Appellant at 16, Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972); Replevin Reconsidered
888.
"Abbott & Peters 963; Replevin Reconsidered 887.
"Recent Decisions, Constitutional Law-Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments-New York
Civil Practice Law and Rules, Article Seventy-One-Prejudgment Seizure Of Chattels in a Re-
plevin Action Without an Order by a Judge Or of a Court of Competent Jurisdiction Is Unconstiltu-
tional, 35 ALBANY L. REv. 370 (1971), suggests two possible reasons for this singular absence of
challenge: the weight gathered from years of use and the fact that "most actions involving prejudg-
ment seizures of chattels involved the poor who were not able to muster enough backing to fight
such a procedure." Id. at 377.
16395 U.S. 337 (1969).
"
7Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 267.01-.22 (1957).
"1395 U.S. at 339.
91d. at 339, 342.
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ring opinion, questioned the constitutionality of even temporary depri-
vation of petitioner's wages without the kind of notice and hearing
"aimed at establishing the validity, or at least the probable validity, of
the underlying claim against the alleged debtor before he can be de-
prived of his property or its unrestricted use.' 20 For Justice Harlan, even
temporary seizure of a property interest that "cannot be characterized
as de minimis" must be predicated on "the usual requisites of proce-
dural due process. ' 2'
Sniadach stressed the importance of the subject matter of the
suit-the fact that the petitioner's earnings were being subjected to
summary seizure. "We deal here with wages-a specialized type of
property presenting distinct problems in our economic system. ' 22 The
decision was thus open to differing interpretation as to whether it ap-
plied only to wage garnishment actions (or at least actions subjecting
the "necessities" of life to summary prejudgment seizure)2 3 or whether
it should be interpreted broadly to apply the requirements of procedural
due process to "the entire domain of prejudgment remedies. ' 24 The
Supreme Court's own reading of Sniadach was less than clear as to its
intended sweep.25
20ld. at 342-43 (emphasis by the Court).
"Id. at 342.
Uld. at 340.
2For a painstaking examination of this question see Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Fin.
Corp., 326 F. Supp. 1335, 1341-48 (E.D. Pa. 1971). For cases limiting Sniadach narrowly to its
facts see, e.g., Reeves v. Motor Contract Co., 324 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Termplan v.
Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 270, 463 P.2d 68 (1969).
24Randone v. Appellate Dept., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 547, 488 P.2d 13, 19, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 715
(1971) (quoted with approval in Fuentes. For other cases construing Sniadach broadly see, e.g.,
Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal.
3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
"Two cases seemed to invoke Sniadach only for its special treatment of wages as a uniquely
important form of property interest: Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18 (1970) (bankrupt's accrued
vacation pay a "specialized type of property," which did not pass to the trustee in bankruptcy);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (summary prejudgment termination of welfare benefits an
unconstitutional denial of procedural due process). Other cases seemed to make the constitutional
requirement of procedural due process turn on the importance of the property interest, although
clearly extending Sniadach to interests less vital than wages. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971),
cited Sniadach for the proposition that state action which adjudicated "important interests" of an
individual require the safeguards of procedural due process and found that suspension of a driver's
license was state action of this nature. Id. at 539-40. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433
(1971), spoke of "the line" which divides protected and non-protected property interests and held
that reputation interests affected by the Wisconsin procedure permitting "posting" to prohibit sale
of liquor to any individual believed to be an excessive drinker fell on the protected side of the line.
Id. at 436-37.
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The scope of Sniadach was clarified, however, by the recent Su-
preme Court holding in Fuentes v. Shevin.6 Fuentes and Parham v.
Cortese (decided together) held the prejudgment replevin statutes of
Florida and Pennsylvania unconstitutional as permitting repossession of
goods under a conditional sales contract without prior notice and oppor-
tunity for a hearing. In Fuentes, petitioner-appellant Margarita Fuentes
had purchased a gas stove and service policy and a stereo phonograph
from Firestone Tire and Rubber Company. Alleging default under the
provisions of the contract, Firestone instituted a small claims action,
concurrently obtaining a writ of replevin through which the disputed
goods were seized by the sheriff. Mrs. Fuentes then brought suit in
federal district court, challenging the constitutionality of the Florida
procedure under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 7
The district court, in Fuentes v. Faircloth,28 followed the minority of
jurisdictions that had interpreted Sniadach as limited to its own facts.
It specifically followed the interpretation of Brunswick Corp. v. J & P,
Inc.,29 which stated that Sniadach "was a unique case involving, [sic] 'a
specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in our eco-
nomic system.' "I It emphasized the recovery provision of the condi-
tional sales contract as sufficient to authorize prejudgment replevin of
a creditor's security interest without the necessity of a prior hearing.3'
The Supreme Court in Fuentes v. Shevin rejected a narrow reading
of Sniadach and instead approved the interpretation that had been
given that case in Randone v. Appellate Department.12 There the court
stated, "Sniadach does not mark a radical departure in constitutional
adjudication. It is not a rivulet of wage garnishment but part of the
mainstream of the past procedural due process decisions of the United
States Supreme Court."33
If the requirements of Sniadach were not limited to wage garnish-
ment actions, neither were they confined to deprivations of other "spe-
cialized" forms of property. Fuentes made it clear that "[t]he Four-
teenth Amendment speaks of 'property' generally. . . . It is not the
2'92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972).
2Id. at 1989.
2317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970), rev'd sub nom. Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972).
"424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970).
'OId. at 105.
3"317 F. Supp. at 958.
"5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P. 2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971).
'Id. at 550, 488 P.2d at 22, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 718, quoted, 92 S. Ct. at 1998 n.22.
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business of a court adjudicating due process rights to make its own
critical evaluation of [property interests] and protect only the ones that,
by its own lights, are 'necessary.' "I The Court adopted the broader
view of Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Sniadach requiring effec-
tive procedural due process before deprivation of any property interest
that is not de minimis.3s The "specialized type of property" language
of Sniadach, which had formed the nucleus of controversy among the
lower courts, was explained to be only an expression of emphasis not
intended to limit the procedural due process requirement to deprivations
of the necessities of life.3"
In reversing the lower court and holding Sniadach controlling, the
Supreme Court nevertheless restated its earlier pronouncements that
"[t]here are 'extraordinary situations' that justify postponing notice and
opportunity for a hearing. '3 At the same time, the Court was careful
to exclude state goals of mere judicial economy or economic efficiency
as justification for such delay. 38 The Court examined some "extraordi-
nary situations" in which it had allowed seizure of property without
tpportunity for prior hearing "to collect the internal revenue of the
United States, to meet the needs of a national war effort, to protect
against the economic disaster of a bank failure, and to protect the public
from misbranded drugs and contaminated foods."3 In each instance it
found crucial common elements:
First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to secure
an important governmental or general public interest. Second, there
has been a special need for very prompt action. Third, the State has
kept strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force: the person
initiating the seizure has been a government official responsible for
determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it
was necessary and justified in the particular instance."
392 S. Ct. at 1999.
35395 U.S. at 342-44; see 92 S. Ct. at 1999 n.21, 2002-03.
1192 S. Ct. at 1998.
"Id. at 1999, citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971). See Sniadach v. Family
Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 597 (1931).
1192 S. Ct. at 1999 n.22. The court in Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1971),
rev'd sub nom. Parham v. Cortese, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972), had balanced these interests of the state
in conserving its financial resources and administrative time together with the security interests of
the creditor and had found them to outweigh the buyer's right not to be deprived temporarily of
property before a hearing.
"192 S. Ct. at 2000 (citations omitted).
40Id.
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The Court denounced summary seizure "when no more than private
gain is directly at stake. The replevin of chattels, as in the present cases,
may satisfy a debt or settle a score. But state intervention in a private
dispute hardly compares to state action furthering a war effort or pro-
tecting the public health."4
In addition to outright seizures, however, the Court noted cases
permitting attachment of property without prior notice and opportunity
to be heard, and observed that these cases also required an important
public interest.42 Attachment was thus classed with seizure as requiring
a "truly unusual" and "extraordinary" situation before the constitu-
tional requirement of procedural due process could be dispensed with.
The Court cited Ownbey v. Morgan, 3 and commented that "attach-
ment necessary to secure jurisdiction in state court" was "clearly a most
basic and important public interest."" The inclusion of Ownbey
suggests, nonetheless, approval of attachment (and by analogy, seizure)
prior to notice and hearing to serve interests that are not altogether
public. The basis for permitting such seizure is the need for a state to
protect the interests of its citizens in obligations owed them by non-
residents.45 It is readily apparent that the primary interest involved is
not that of the state but that of its citizens-private individuals. This
type of interest is easily distinguishable from the kinds of "governmen-
tal" and "general public" interests otherwise adverted to by the Court.
The Court implied that certain situations involving only private
interests may fall within the category of "extraordinary circumstances"
justifying summary prejudgment seizure of property: "There may be
cases in which a creditor could make a showing of immediate danger
that a debtor will destroy or conceal disputed goods."4 Since Fuentes
did not present the issue, the Court did not say directly what would be
the creditor's prerogative should the statute require a showing of such
danger of destruction or concealment and should he be able to make
such a showing. In the Court's observation of what was lacking in the
statutes, however, there is the strong suggestion that if the missing
elements were supplied, the law might be acceptable. 7
411d.
421d. at 1999 n.23.
43256 U.S. 94 (1921).
1192 S. Ct. at 1999 n.23.
4 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1878).
1192 S. Ct. at 2000-01.
71d. at 2000. In Sniadach, too, the Court made a similar implication when it stated that
[Vol. 51
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The case for the creditor in Fuentes was a strong one. 8 In addition
to the weight of years of unchallenged use of summary prejudgment
replevin, there were several specific factors that weighed in favor of
permitting summary seizure: (1) The creditor had retained title and had,
at the time of repossession, a substantial security interest in the mer-
chandise; (2) the dispossession was only temporary, pending litigation,
which the replevying party was required by law to initiate and prosecute
promptly;49 (3) Florida required the party invoking its replevin law to
post bond of at least double the value of the goods;" (4) the statute
provided for recovery of the property by the party replevied against
upon posting of a counterbond;51 and (5) the conditional sales contract
under which the stove and stereo were purchased provided that the seller
at his option could repossess the goods upon default of any payment.
Each of these factors was noted and argued persuasively in the brief for
the appellee, 52 but each was answered and disposed of by the Court.
The protection afforded by the fourteenth amendment is not re-
served exclusively for interests of legal ownership, but extends as well
to possessory interests.5 3 The Court noted that Mrs. Fuentes had ac-
quired the right to possession and use of the disputed goods, which was
a property interest "sufficient to invoke the protection of the Due Pro-
cess Clause."54 Although this right to possession was conditioned upon
continued payment of installments toward purchase, there might have
been some defense to non-payment. But even if there were obvious
default without apparent excuse, the right to prior notice and opportun-
garnishment might be constitutional "in extraordinary situations [citing Ownbey, inter alia]. But
in the present case no situation requiring special protection to a state or creditor interest is
presented by the facts; nor is the Wisconsin statute narrowly drawn to meet any such unusual
condition." 395 U.S. at 339 (emphasis added). The Court seems to suggest, though, that the only
creditor interest sufficient to remove the need for prior hearing is an interest in obtaining jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate his claim. Id. Despite the vagueness of both Sniadach and Fuentes on this point,
it seems likely that a narrowly drawn provision limiting seizure without notice or opportunity for
hearing to those "extraordinary situations" in which it could be demonstrated to the satisfaction
of an appropriate state official that the creditor's security interests were indeed in danger of
destruction or concealment would not be found unconstitutional.
4 The following analysis refers only to the dispute between Mrs. Fuentes and Firestone.
"
9FLA. STAT. ANN. § 78.07 (1964).
50Id.
511d. § 78.13 (1964). "Counterbond" is the Supreme Court's term. 92 S. Ct. at 1993.
5"Brief for Appellee Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. at 44-5 1, Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983
(1972).
'492 S. Ct. at 1997.
541d.
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ity for a hearing would not be obviated.55 The dissent accused the major-
ity of ignoring "the creditor's interest in preventing further use and
deterioration of the property in which he has substantial interest."" It
might be observed, however, that the creditor's security interest, like the
continued possessory interest of the purchaser, was contingent. Both
interests turned upon default of the purchaser without defense, which
could only be determined at an evidentiary hearing.
The Court noted the temporary nature of the summary disposses-
sion under the Florida statute, but refused to draw a distinction between
permanent and "temporary, nonfinal" deprivations for purposes of pro-
cedural due process:-" "The Fourteenth Amendment draws no bright
lines around three-day, 10-day or 50-day deprivations of property. Any
significant taking of property by the State is within the purview of the
Due Process Clause."5 8
The Court quickly disposed of the appellee's argument that the
bonding requirements of Florida's replevin law, together with available
legal remedies for abuse of process, wrongful attachment, and malicious
prosecution, served to protect the replevin defendant against frivolous
dispossession by noting simply that these "less effective" safeguards
were "no substitute for an informed evaluation by a neutral official."" °
Not only are these deterrents uncertain,61 but "as a matter of constitu-
tional principle," they are no substitute for the affirmative constitu-
tional right to a prior hearing, which is "the only truly effective safe-
guard against arbitrary deprivation of property." 2
The counterbond provision suffers as a safeguard from the same
deficiencies as the bond provision, with the additional defect that the
typical replevin defendant will seldom be able to afford it.3 The Court
55Id.
"Id. at 2005.
5id. at 1996.
"Id. at 1997.
51Brief for Appellee Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. at 46-47, Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983
(1972).
092 S. Ct. at 1996.
"The bad faith creditor can gamble that the alleged debtor will not know of the remedies
available to him, or knowing of them, will not elect to pursue them. Another real problem is that
the debtor, often impecunious, may not have the resources to pursue his remedies. Further, the
replevin plaintiff knows he will recover his bond if the defendant fails to appear to litigate, or
appearing, is unable effectively to present his defenses. See id. at 1995 n.13.
'lid. at 1996.
"For a discussion of the inequities of these bonding provisions in the context of attachment,
see Alexander, Wrongful Attachment Damages Must be Fixed in the Original Suit, 4 U.S.F.L.
[Vol. 51
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noted that the Wisconsin garnishment statute in Sniadach had a similar
counterbond recovery provision,64 and yet there Justice Harlan, in his
concurring opinion, stated that the requirements of notice and hearing
were not satisfied "by the fact that relief from the garnishment may
have been available in the interim under less than clear circumstan-
ces." 
65
The last major issue dealt with by the Court was the issue of
whether the replevin defendants waived their procedural due process
rights by signing the conditional sales contract providing for reposses-
sion in the event of default of payments. While agreeing that this right
could be contractually waived, the Court held that there was no such
waiver under the facts of Fuentes.66 The Court relied on its recent deci-
sion in D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co. ,67 which outlined the require-
ments for a valid contractual waiver of due process rights. In Overmyer
the Court upheld such a waiver provision but stated that if it were part
of an adhesion contract and no consideration were given for the waiver,
"other legal consequences may ensue.' '68 The suggestion by the Court
is clear that the "purported waiver provision" in Fuentes was part of a
contract of adhesion.69 Aside from the adhesion contract problem, how-
ever, the Court found that the purported waiver was not in fact a waiver,
since it provided only that the seller, upon default of payments by the
buyer, could repossess. "The contracts included nothing about the
waiver of a prior hearing."70 Indeed, there was no clear statement of the
process by which the goods would be repossessed.
71
The Supreme Court gave the due process clause of the fourteenth
REV. 38, 39-42 (1969). See Brief for Appellant at 22, Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972).
"92 S. Ct. at 1996 n.15.
15395 U.S. at 343.
192 S. Ct. at 2001-02.
1192 S. Ct. 775 (1972).
Id. at 783. In Overmyer, two corporations, negotiating through their respective lawyers,
executed a cognovit note. The Court found that Overmyer had "voluntarily, intelligently and
knowingly waived the rights it otherwise possessed to prejudgment notice and hearing." Id. In
invoking the standard of waiver applicable to a criminal proceeding, the Court did not impose this
standard upon cases involving only property rights but merely noted that if such standard applied,
it was met in the Overmyer case. Id. at 782. It might not be too much to speculate in this era of
concern for consumer rights, however, that the "voluntary, intelligent and knowing" standard for
waiver of constitutional rights in a criminal proceeding may be adopted for protection of property
rights. Cf. Swarb v. Lennox, 92 S. Ct. 767 (1972).
1192 S. Ct. at 2002.70 d.
711d.
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amendment a broad reading in Fuentes. It held that except in "extraor-
dinary situations" or where there has been a valid waiver, notice and
an opportunity to be heard must precede the deprivation of any property
interest that cannot be characterized as de minimis. Even a temporary,
nonfinal deprivation of nonessential property to which the possessor has
only possessory rights is not a de minimis property interest. Although
this procedural due process right can be waived, it will admit of no
substitute. Bond and counterbond provisions and civil remedies are
"lesser safeguards" that will not suffice to replace the provisions of the
fourteenth amendment.
Following Sniadach, but before Fuentes, it was suggested that gen-
eral creditor attachment would be unconstitutional, except in situations
involving purely commercial interests or where there is demonstrated
danger of destruction or concealment of the object of attachment."
Since the general creditor, unlike the seller on conditional contract, has
no specific property interest in the property to be attached, it would
seem more clear after Fuentes that summary general creditor attach-
ment will be unable to withstand constitutional attack, at least where
the action is against a resident debtor and there is no demonstrated
danger of destruction or concealment of the property. 7
3
What recourse remains for the secured creditor after Fuentes?
Claim and delivery as it has been practiced is clearly no longer possi-
ble.74 Legislative change is required for the North Carolina claim and
delivery statute.75
"Comment, The Constitutional Validity of Attachment in Light of Sniadach v. Family Fi-
nance Corp., 17 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 837, 845-49 (1970).
"Like the attachment laws of most states, the North Carolina law in this area appears to be
drawn narrowly. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-440.3(4), (5) (1969). If danger of concealment or
destruction is within the "exceptional circumstance" exception of Fuentes, it would seem that this
North Carolina law is constitutional. The continuing validity of Ownbey supports the use of
attachment to secure quasi in rem jurisdiction over foreign debtors. Cf N.C. GEN. STAT. § I-
440.3(l)-(3) (1969).
7 Immediately after the Fuentes decisi6n was handed down, a memorandum issued from the
North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts to the North Carolina judiciary, advising that
the North Carolina claim and delivery provisions were unconstitutional. Memorandum from Tay-
lor McMillan to Chief District Judges, June 15, 1972.
75The North Carolina claim and delivery statute is found in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-472 to -
484 (1969). In advance of legislative change by the General Assembly, procedure has been judicially
established for Mecklenburg County in Campbell v. Wofford, No. 72-CvD-8375 (Mecklenburg
County Dist. Ct. Aug. 8, 1972), for the use of claim and delivery with appended Fuentes safeguards.
This procedure includes provision for notice and hearing before the Clerk or Assistant Clerk of
Superior Court, except where an "extraordinary situation" (defined as immediate danger to the
security interests of the plaintiff) is found by the clerk to exist, or where the clerk finds a valid
[Vol. 51
FUENTES V. SHEVIN
A primary requisite for a constitutional claim and delivery statute
is a provision for notice and opportunity for hearing prior to issuance
of the claim and delivery order, except where there is a valid waiver, or
where there are "exceptional circumstances." However, Fuentes
emphasizes that the hearing for which opportunity must be given the
defendant need not be a formal one. The scheduling, nature, and form
of the hearing may depend upon "the simplicity of the issues,""6 the
relative importance of the property interest involved, 77 and even the
apparent likelihood of the defendant's succeeding on the merits. 78 The
Court stated that "the nature and form of such prior hearings . . . are
legitimately open to many potential variations and are a subject, at this
point, for legislation-not adjudication. ' 79
There may be room under Fuentes for a narrow provision permit-
ting claim and delivery prior to notice and hearing where the plaintiff
can present evidence that destruction or concealment by defendant is
likely.8 0 Presumably, the requirements for this provision are analogous
to those for a temporary restraining order, another ex parte proceeding.
If so, likelihood of irreparable harm to the plaintiff would justify the
interposition of the court.8'
It is emphasized by Fuentes that only an "opportunity" for hearing
is required. A hearing need not be held if the defendant, having been
given notice of his opportunity to be heard, elects not to appear to
present his defenses. 2 Accordingly, for convenience of the parties and
to conserve judicial time, provision could be made for a waiver13 of this
hearing, executed in writing before an officer of the court.8 4
contractual waiver, together with a finding of probability that the defendant "voluntarily, intelli-
gently and knowingly" made such a waiver.
1192 S. Ct. at 1998 n.18.
"Id. at 1999 n.21.
"AId. at 2002 n.33.
lid. at 2002.
"sCompare requirements for attachment in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-440.3(5) (1969).
"Cf. FED. R. COv. P. 65; N.C.R. Civ. P. 65(b).
"192 S. Ct. at 2000 n.29.
"This waiver of the right to a hearing after notice has been provided should not be confused
with a contractual waiver of the right to notice and hearing discussed below. The difficulties which
attend the latter are much less troublesome where the waiver comes after notice when the replevin
defendant is more likely to be aware of the significance of this act.
"A recent undated memorandum prepared by Roger Hendrix for Wachovia-American Credit
Corp. outlined suggested legislative action for the 1973 North Carolina General Assembly to
conform North Carolina law to the requirements of Fuentes. An appendix to this memorandum
includes a suggested waiver form.
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In addition to statutory remedy, it may be possible for a purchaser
under a conditional sales contract to waive his procedural due process
rights contractually within the bounds of Fuentes.85 However, in view
of the presumption against waiver of constitutional rights, 8 the strong
tendency of courts to refuse enforcement of terms highly disadvanta-
geous to the weaker party in contracts of adhesion, 7 and the fact that
such a purported waiver will have been executed prior to the time when
most consumer defenses arise (making it likely that the waiver was not
made with full awareness of its consequences),8 it seems unlikely that
such a waiver could be enforced in the typical consumer context. At the
very least, a contractual waiver would have to be clear and unequivocal,
leaving no doubt that the purchaser or borrower is agreeing not only to
return or collection per se, but also to return or collection without notice
or an opportunity to present any defenses.8
Another creditor's remedy is self-help. However, where these acts
expressly rely upon Uniform Commercial Code sections 9-503 and 9-
504, their constitutionality is in dispute, as evidenced by recent conflict-
ing U.S. District Court decisions in California.
"Cf note 75 supra, describing the Mecklenburg County procedure.
"
8Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937). These two cases were cited in Fuentes. 92 S. Ct. at 2001 n.31.
"See Shuchman, Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contracts, 35 TEMPLE L.Q. 125, especially
cases cited at 132-34 (1962). See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302; N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 25-2-302 (1971). In the context of secured sales agreements, see, e.g., Santiago v. McElroy, 319
F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
"Brief for Appellant at 28, Parham v. Cortese, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972).
"See 92 S. Ct. at 2002.
"
0 Since Fuentes is a fourteenth amendment decision, 92 S. Ct. at 1996, "state action" must
be present in any deprivation of property to which it is sought to be applied. Adickes v. S.H. Kress
& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 169 (1970). Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), found the
necessary state action component in the implementation through private contractual agreements
of state policy embodied in §§ 9503-04 of the California Commercial Code. Id. at 617. The court
cited Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), as authority for its determination that mere
encouragement by state law of private acts inconsistent with constitutional mandate was sufficient
to bring those acts within the control of the fourteenth amendment. 338 F. Supp. at 617. The Code
provisions were therefore held unconstitutional, and the acts of repossession in reliance on the Code
provisions were held illegal. Id. at 622. Oiler v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972),
reached the opposite conclusion, however, by refusing to find state action in private contracts
providing for self-help along the lines of the Uniform Commercial Code provisions. The Oiler court
felt that Reitman, dealing as it did with racial discrimination, was not controlling in a debtor-
creditor context: "The historical, legal and moral considerations fundamental to extending federal
jurisdiction to meet racial injustices are simply not present in the instant case." Id. at 23. It should
be noted that California Commercial Code § 9503 adopts the Official Text of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code without change. California Commercial Code § 9504 substantially adopts the Official
[Vol. 51
THE "QUASI-PUBLIC" FORUM
The economic impact of Fuentes has yet to be demonstrated. The
dissent expressed concern that "the availability of credit may well be
diminished or, in any event, the expense of securing it increased."9 It
seems probable, though, that the requirements of Fuentes will have
minimal effect on consumer credit. Only where the debtor is willing to
destroy or conceal the goods would the creditor's risk be appreciably
increased by the requirement of notice before seizure. And if this is
indeed an "extraordinary circumstance," then Fuentes does not pre-
clude seizure without notice. Moreover, even where required, the ex-
pense of procedural due process need not be substantial, since informal
hearings may suffice in many cases9" and may probably be waived93 in
others. It seems probable that the prophecy of the dissent in Fuentes will
not materialize.
KENT WASHBURN
Constitutional Law-First Amendment-Shopping Centers and the
"Quasi-Public" Forum
That "freedom of speech" involves something more than a federal
and state' laissez-faire attitude toward expression is hardly a novel con-
cept.2 The Supreme Court has typically asserted that an affirmative
"maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion . . . is a
Text, but makes the notice provisions more specific. CAL. COMM. CODE ANN. § 9503-04 (1964).
9192 S. Ct. at 2005. This same fear was expressed by the court in Adams. 338 F. Supp. at
622. The same argument was made in support of the California summary attachment procedure
to the court in Randone-and was rejected. Randone v. Appellate Dept., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 555-56,
488 P.2d 13, 24-26, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 721-22 (1971); see Comment, 17 U.C.L.A.L. REV., supra
note 72, at 846. Collection agencies also had argued that wage garnishment was essential to the
economy, but an empirical study has indicated that "the extension of consumer credit is unrelated
to garnishment laws." Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California: A Study and Recommendations,
53 CALIF. L. REV. 1214, 1240 (1965).
"
2See text accompanying notes 76-79 supra.
"See text accompanying notes 83-84 supra.
'The first amendment reaches the states through the fourteenth amendment. Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
2See, e.g., Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 559 (1941). Professor Barron
maintains that "[a]s a Constitutional theory for the communication of ideas, laissez-faire is mani-
festly irrelevant." Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1641, 1656 (1967).
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fundamental principle of our constitutional system."' 3 Yet behind the
rhetoric lies the persistent problem of defining the contours of first
amendment protection in particular situations.4 Especially difficult is
the resolution of those cases which reveal an asserted first amendment
right posed in direct confrontation with other rights and interests no less
traditional in our society.' It is thus interesting to note that in a recent
case involving conflicting claims of free speech and private property
interests, a majority of the Supreme Court found few obstacles in hold-
ing squarely on the side of the property owner.
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner' involved the mall of a large privately owned
shopping center as the stage for respondents' short-lived attempts to
circulate antiwar leaflets. The shopping center prohibited handbilling on
the premises, and respondents were advised by security guards that a
failure to cease their activity could result in trespass prosecutions. Res-
pondents subsequently petitioned for relief in federal district court, al-
leging a violation of their first amendment right to distribute leaflets in
Lloyd Center in a nondisruptive manner. In granting broad injunctive
relief,7 the district court cited Marsh v. Alabama' and Food Employees
Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.' as authority for the proposition
that to the extent that private property is open to the public and resem-
bles a "business district," the owner loses the absolute right to prohibit
first amendment activity on his premises.' 0
On appeal," the Supreme Court reversed.'2 Writing for a five-to-
four majority, Justice Powell reasoned that Marsh and Logan Valley
were inapposite precedents for a case in which the asserted first amend-
ment exercise was not related to the shopping center's normal use and
an adequate alternative forum was available. The consistent enforce-
ment of a nondiscriminatory policy prohibiting all handbilling was enti-
3Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
4T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT vii-viii (1963).
See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing of armbands
threatens school discipline); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (destruction of draft
card).
692 S. Ct. 2219 (1972).
'Tanner v. Lloyd Corp., 308 F. Supp. 128 (D. Ore. 1970).
8326 U.S. 501 (1946).
9391 U.S. 308 (1968).
"*308 F. Supp. at 132.
"The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision per curiam.
Tanner v. Lloyd Corp., 446 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1971).
t"Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 92 S. Ct. 2219 (1972).
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tled to protection under the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. 13 Justice Marshall in dissent sharply attacked the majority's
opinion as an arbitrary limitation of the rationale of Logan Valley and
Marsh.4 An understanding of the judicial conflicts present in this case
is impossible at this point without a brief review of Marsh and Logan
Valley and their place in first amendment theory.
One first amendment concept that runs consistently throughout
cases and commentaries alike is that an open "marketplace of ideas" is
essential to the health of a democratic society.'5 To maintain an in-
formed electorate as a check on the powers of the state, it is held
necessary that debate, "even of ideas we hate,"' 6 be kept "uninhibited,
robust, and wide open."' 17 The rights protected by the first amendment
are the rights of the public, and the special solicitude shown by the
courts for the guarantees of free "speech"' 8 attests to judicial recogni-
tion of this public interest. 9 This concept has received dramatic support
in the Supreme Court's development of special protection of the "public
forum." The town square, the streets, the parks, and the sidewalks of a
community have been accorded special status as the proper and tradi-
tional locale for public discussion and assembly. Although the privilege
of their use may be regulated in the public interest, "it must not, in the
guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.""0 Of central importance is
'
31d. at 2228.
"Id. at 2230 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353,
365 (1937); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See generally T. EMERSON, supra
note 4; A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1948).
""Full and free discussion even of ideas we hate encourages the testing of our own prejudices
and preconceptions." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 584 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
""Speech" in the first amendment sense includes more than verbal expression. See, e.g.,
Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing of armband); Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) ("freedom march"); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940)
(picketing). But even "pure speech" is not absolutely protected, Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47, 52 (1919), and first amendment exercise may be regulated to the extent that it conflicts with
other important interests, United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). Professor Kalven
suggests that the pure speech-speech plus dichotomy is misleading. He proposes instead the notion
that regulation of speech should be deemed constitutionally permissible only insofar as it controls
conduct and not content. Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup.
CT. REv. 1, 25-27. See also A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 15, at 24-28.
"Cf. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969): "It is the right of the
public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences
which is crucial here."
2Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939).
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the assumption that the public's access to all sides of an issue can best
be protected by providing a readily available forum for the "poor man's
press": the leaflets, placards, and soapbox oratory of those who have
no access to more expensive or exclusive media, but whose ideas de-
serve to be heard nevertheless. 21
Marsh v. Alabama2 2 represented another step in the genesis of the
public forum doctrine, but with a new twist. When Gracie Marsh sought
to distribute religious literature in the downtown business district of
Chickasaw, Alabama, she was treading on private, not public property.
Her chosen forum for spreading the Word chanced to be in the midst
of a company town owned lock, stock, and sidewalk by a private corpo-
ration. Simply posed, the issue was whether a "private" town could
impose restrictions that would not pass constitutional scrutiny if they
emanated from a municipality. The Court held that it could not. In
reversing the trespass conviction, Justice Black stressed the interests of
the community's citizens in free access to uncensored information. 3
The fact that title to the property was privately held was of little conse-
quence; a corporation, carrying on what properly were state functions
of municipal government, could not restrict the residents' rights any
more than could the state. Property rights were not to be taken as
absolute: "Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The
more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the
public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the
statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it."24
Marsh was more than just an interesting "state action" case.25 Of
no small import to Justice Black were the interests of the public, not
merely the rights of the individual defendant, in the maintenance of an
open channel of communication. Logan Valley found this theme no less
relevant to the modern shopping center. The case involved a labor
union's peaceful picketing of a supermarket located in a private shop-
21Cf Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1942), wherein Justice Black spoke of
the "poorly financed causes of little people."
-326 U.S. 501 (1946).
uChickasaw residents "must make decisions which affect the welfare of the community and
nation. To act as good citizens they must be informed . . . It]heir information must be uncen-
sored." 326 U.S. at 508.
2'326 U.S. at 506 (emphasis added).
"In Marsh, "state action" for fourteenth amendment purposes was found in the delegation
of normal state functions to a private concern. See the further discussion of "state action" problems
infra.
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ping center. A five-to-four majority held that state trespass law could
not be the basis of an antipicket injunction. Characterizing Marsh as
representative of the principle that "under some circumstances property
that is privately owned may, at least for First Amendment purposes, be
treated as though it were publicly held, '2 6 Justice Marshall found no
significant distinction between Chickasaw's business district and Logan
Valley Plaza. In support of the holding that the center was "clearly the
functional equivalent of the business district . . involved in Marsh,"
he noted the substantial size of the shopping center involved, the public's
unrestricted access to Plaza property, the presence of two large enter-
prises, and the elaborate system of streets and sidewalks traversing the
complex.27
It is true that Justice Black, the father of Marsh, refused to ac-
knowledge the legitimacy of Marsh's offspring in Logan Valley. It is
further true that Justice Marshall's shopping center-business district
comparison glossed over some factual dissimilarities between the two
cases that the dissenting opinions found important.28 One must examine
the reason why Justice Marshall found the analogy so compelling. A
clue may be found in the closing passages of his opinion in which he
examined the sociological impact of the "advent of the suburban shop-
ping center. ' 29 Here he made it clear that the shopping center had
become such an important phenomenon in suburban life that any deci-
sion restricting the exercise of first amendment freedoms in such areas
would adversely affect "workers seeking to challenge substandard work-
ing conditions, consumers protesting shoddy or overpriced merchandise,
and minority groups seeking nondiscriminatory hiring practices." 3
Such a result would be "at variance with the goal of free expression and
communication that is at the heart of the First Amendment. '31 Mea-
sured in this context, the owner's property rights were not so strong as
to negate the public interests involved.
2'Id. at 316.
1Jd. at 317-18.
"Justice Black insisted in Logan Valley that Marsh allowed private property to be treated as
public only when it had taken on all the attributes of a municipality and not merely a few. Id. at
327 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice White added the fear that the rationale of Logan Valley would
compel all businesses to open up to unwanted first amendment activity. Id. at 338-40 (White, J.,
ddissenting).
"391 U.S. at 324.
3Id.
111d. at 325.
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Two points central to the reasoning in Logan Valley merit special
attention. First, the view of the shopping center as an increasingly signif-
icant forum for suburban activity led to the "business district" analogy.
Justice Marshall reasserted this point in Lloyd: "For many ...citi-
zens, Lloyd Center will so completely satisfy their wants that they will
have no reason to go elsewhere. . . . If speech is to reach these people,
it must reach them in Lloyd Center. ' 32 The suburban shopping center
does not merely resemble the urban business district; it replaces it.
Secondly, although the public's interest in the maintenance of an open
forum was found to outweigh the owner's property interests in Logan
Valley, the owner was said to retain the power to make "reasonable
regulations" as to the location and manner of the first amendment
exercise on his property3 The Court's holding was- the result of a
balancing process that weighed the various interests of each party.
In spite of the inventiveness of Logan Valley's extension of the
Marsh "principle," the opinion unfortunately contained one major
ambiguity. The holding was limited to a situation in which the "message
sought to be conveyed" concerned the employment practices of a store
on the premises; expressly not considered was "whether . . .property
rights could . ..justify a bar on [first amendment activity] n6t thus
directly related in its purpose to the use to which the shopping center
was being put. ' 34 The intended meaning of this language is not clear.35
Typical of the confusion that resulted was the disparate treatment given
on two levels of appeal to a post-Logan Valley case involving
"unrelated-to" first amendment activity. In Diamond v. Bland,'3 plain-
tiffs sought to confirm their alleged right to enter a private shopping
center and solicit signatures for an anti-pollution petition. The Califor-
nia Court of Appeals refused relief. Relying on Logan Valley's "related-
to" language, the court fashioned a twofold requirement: the asserted
first amendment exercise must be both relevant to shopping center busi-
3Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 92 S. Ct. 2219, 2234 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
3391 U.S. at 320-21. Thus the owner may reasonably regulate conduct but not content. Cf.
note 18 supra.
11391 U.S. at 320 n.9.
"It has been suggested that the limitation was an attempt to calm the fears of dissenting
Justice White. Comment, The Shopping Center: Quasi-Public Forum for Suburbia, 6 U.S.F.L.
REV. 103, 108 (1971).
3'8 Cal. App. 3d 58, 87 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1970), rev'd, 3 Cal. 3d 653, 477 P.2d 733, 91 Cal. Rptr.
501, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971).
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ness and without any effective alternative channel of communication
before it may demand a forum on private property.37 On appeal the
California Supreme Court reversed. Conceding that the question of
"relatedness" merited some consideration, the majority nevertheless
concluded that plaintiffs' interests outweighed the owner's right to im-
pose a complete ban on nonrelated communicatory activity. Regardless
of the possibility of alternative forums available to the plaintiffs, the
court stressed that access to the center provided a particularly appropri-
ate vehicle for the obtaining of signatures on a petition. 8 A completely
different "balance" was struck than that obtained in the lower court.
The two Diamond cases prove that Logan Valley's "related-to"
language could be conveniently seized upon or as easily bypassed, de-
pending upon the result desired. The Lloyd decision has now at least
identified the authoritative (five-to-four) interpretation. Justice Powell,
writing for the majority, emphasized the lack of any relation, direct or
indirect, between antiwar leafletting and shopping center operations. He
further noted that respondents had been free to pursue their handbilling
in the public areas outside Lloyd Center.39 These two factors were
deemed sufficient to distinguish the Lloyd situation from that in Logan
Valley:
Logan Valley extended Marsh . . . only in a context where the
First Amendment activity was related to the shopping center's opera-
tions. . . . The holding in Logan Valley was not dependent upon the
suggestion that the privately owned streets and sidewalks of a business
district or a shopping center are the equivalent, for First Amendment
purposes, of municipally owned streets and sidewalks."
Thus, a footnote in Logan Valley indicating what was not being
decided" was elevated to the status of expressing the "rationale" of that
case. The Lloyd court adopted substantially the same formula as that
engendered in the California intermediate court's treatment of
Diamond. Once this judicial plastic surgery was performed, the respon-
dents' theories were quickly dismissed. Their argument that Lloyd Cen-
ter was open to the public and resembled in function the public forum
1'8 Cal. App. 3d at 73-74, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 107-08.
13 Cal. 3d at 662, 477 P.2d at 738, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 506; accord, Sutherland v. Southcenter
Shopping Center, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 833, 478 P.2d 792 (1971).
"Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 92 S. Ct. 2219, 2226-27 (1972).
4
°ld. at 225-26 (emphasis added).
"
1See text accompanying note 34 supra.
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of a municipal business district could now be rejected as "considerably
broader than the rationale in Logan Valley."4 In short, "[t]he Constitu-
tion by no means requires such an attenuated doctrine of dedication of
private property to public use."4
Dissenting in Lloyd, Justice Marshall observed that the majority
was "obviously troubled" by the decision in Logan Valley. Certainly it
is significant that Justice Powell's analysis of Logan Valley quoted
extensively and with approval from the dissenting opinions in that case.' 4
The Lloyd majority apparently felt that Logan Valley represented the
maximum in imposing constitutionally tolerable burdens on the prop-
erty owner's interests. First amendment interests were deemed suffi-
ciently protected by requiring a forum to be provided on private prop-
erty only where both (a) the speech is "directly related" to the normal
use of the locale, and (b) no "adequate" alternative forum exists."
Forcing an owner to yield in other situations "would diminish property
rights without significantly enhancing the asserted right of free
speech."' 6
The "related to" and "no adequate alternative" criteria may be
seen as an attempt to formulate workable guidelines for the complex
process of accomodating conflicting rights. If this is so, the question is
whether it is a successful attempt. An examination of a number of
problems implicit in the Lloyd holding is therefore appropriate.
A. THE UNEASY MARRIAGE OF "RELATED To" AND "ADEQUATE
ALTERNATIVE FORUM"
Justice Marshall indicated in his Lloyd dissent that the shopping
center management in the past had found it a good business practice to
allow the use of its facilities by certain political candidates and service
organizations. Thus, he reasoned, having already opened its premises to
492 S. Ct. at 2226.
431d. at 2229.
"Id. at 2226-27.
45Logan Valley was characterized as representing just such a situation and no more:
The [Logan Valley] opinion was carefully phrased to limit its holding to the picket-
ing involved, where the picketing was "directly related in its purpose to the use to which
the shopping center property was being put" . . . and where . . . no other reasonable
opportunities for the pickets to convey their message . . . were available.
Neither of these elements is present in the case now before the Court.
Id. at 2226.
"Id. at 2228.
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first amendment activities, Lloyd Center should not be heard to claim
that respondents' handbilling was not related to the normal use of the
mall.47 This interpretation was rejected. Instead, Justice Powell appar-
ently would require that the subject of the message touch more directly
on some aspect of the center's retail enterprise. But how substantial
should the connection be? What of the situation in which the ultimate
objective of a protest relates only indirectly to a part of the shopping
center, as where a union pickets a store because that store buys advertis-
ing space from an antiunion newspaper?" To go one step further, could
the respondents in Lloyd have transformed their handbilling into "re-
lated" activity simply by amending their leaflets to include a protest
against the sale of Dow Chemical products by a shopping center store?
It is doubtful that such a transparent maneuver would succeed," but the
contours of the "related to" requirement remain unclear nevertheless.
When considered in light of the amount of traffic involved and the
convenience of the public, a shopping center may be the most effective
and appropriate place to gather signatures for a petition. On the other
hand, any public sidewalk might be deemed an "adequate alternative"
to the shopping center forum when no more than the assurance of some
opportunity for the message to get to some of the public is examined.
It is not clear to what degree the Lloyd concept of "adequate" encom-
passes the idea of "equally effective." At the very least, an adequate
alternative forum should be one that reaches substantially the same
audience, whether or not the message had been directed specifically to
them or generally to the public. Any lesser measure would ignore the
"public forum" basis of the first amendment. Thus the Lloyd criteria
are ambiguous. Justice Powell noted at one point in his opinion that
respondents could have moved to "any public street" (access to some
"If a "quasi-public" enterprise has offered a neutral forum for some "speech" of a certain
medium, it cannot logically claim that it is hurt by having to accept other "speech" of the same
medium and on the same basis, without regard to content. This "equal protection" approach to
the first amendment has gained some limited acceptance in recent mass media cases. See, e.g.,
Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
granted, 92 S. Ct. 1174 (1972) (broadcasting station must accept antiwar editorials); Zucker v.
Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (school newspaper must publish antiwar editorial); Wirta
v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District, 68 Cal. 2d 51, 434 P.2d 982, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967)
(transit company that accepts commercial ads must accept political ads). See also Barron, Access-
The Only Choice for the Media?, 48 TExAs L. REV. 766 (1970).
4
'Jn re Lane, 71 Cal. 2d 872, 457 P.2d 561, 79 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1969). The Lane court held
that the shopping center must provide a forum.
49Cf Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 55 (1942).
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of the public);5 elsewhere, however, he emphasized that access to the
patrons of Lloyd Center (the same audience) was readily available on
the sidewalks surrounding the complex.5
It is obvious that the more the message is related to the normal use
of the shopping center, the less likely it is that a suitable alternative
forum exists, since the message propagated in any other place would
prove largely irrelevant. "Related to" and "adequate alternative forum"
are thus interrelated criteria. But one is not always the function of the
other. Consider the assertion of "nonrelated to" first amendment activ-
ity in the context of a private shopping center located at the crossroads
of a private industrial complex but otherwise proximate to no streets or
sidewalks on which the "speech" could safety be exercised. Areas such
as this are not uncommon today; presumably it was this kind of pheno-
menon, less the physical copy of the town square than its functional
replacement, upon which Justice Marshall was meditating when he
wrote Logan Valley. As applied here, the dual requirement test of Lloyd
would apparently deny use of the center to those without consent. Yet
with no forum available, "adequate" or otherwise, the public right to
an open "marketplace of ideas" would be abridged." Insofar as it is
intended to preserve a proper balance between first amendment interests
and private property rights, the Lloyd formula breaks down at this
point.
B. THE UNEASY DIVORCE OF Lloyd FROM Logan Valley
Justice Powell's argument in Lloyd stressed the protection of prop-
erty accorded by the due process clause and found that free speech
would not be "significantly enhanced" by allowing respondents to pre-
vail. Justice Marshall stressed in dissent the "preferred place" of free-
dom of speech "in our hierarchy of values" 3 and found that the prop-
1192 S. Ct. at 2227.
'lid. at 2228.
"rhere is room for the contention that such a result is not necessarily compelled by Lloyd,
since affording a forum in this case would "significantly enhance" the right of free speech. How-
ever, with Logan Valley specifically restricted to the fact situation in which both the elements of
"related to" and "no adequate alternative" are present, see note 45 and accompanying text supra,
such an argument would have to be forged anew from a general theory that the first amendment
requires affirmative state action in the providing of public forums. But Lloyd indicates that the
present majority of the Court is something less than receptive to this concept. See text accompany-
ing notes 54-55 infra.
"92 S. Ct. at 2234 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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erty rights asserted in Lloyd paled in comparison. The two opinions
simply approached the same problem from opposite ends of the spec-
trum.
But Lloyd represents more than a limitation of the holding in
Logan Valley. If Lloyd did not expressly overrule the holding in Logan
Valley, it effectively mutilated its rationale. This discussion thus far has
been confined to the subject of shopping centers because, after Lloyd,
it is doubtful whether Logan Valley has precedential value in any other
context. The key to this problem lies in the concept of "state action."
Before first amendment rights may be asserted in a nonfederal context,
some involvement of the state in the alleged abridgement of free speech
must be found to invoke the fourteenth amendment. Marsh was based
on the fiction that municipal government carried on by a private concern
constituted a delegation of state authority. However, if the state is
primarily responsible for the maintenance of its municipalities, it is not
so affirmatively charged with regard to shopping centers. Thus, Justice
Marshall's reliance on Marsh to extend first amendment protection
within the confines of Logan Valley Plaza represented a rather dramatic
extension of notions of state action. His treatment of Marsh implied
that as private property takes on the attributes of a citizens' forum, the
first amendment compels the state to guarantee free speech no less than
on the public streets.
By undercutting Justice Marshall's "business district" analogy, the
Lloyd majority effectively sterilizes Logan Valley as authority for this
concept of the "quasi-public forum." The validity of various applica-
tions of the Logan Valley rationale54 to non-shopping center situations
is thus put in doubt. More importantly, the Lloyd majority's distin-
guishing away of Logan Valley connotes a conservative reluctance to
embrace the concept of the "quasi-public" forum. At least where private
property interests are concerned, the Court does not seem very sympa-
thetic to the argument that social regulation should assume a more
affirmative role in the maintenance of the open forum.5
51E.g., Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
940 (1968) (bus terminal); In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967)
(railway terminal).
"Cf T. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 38: "The complexities of modern society have introduced
into the free marketplace of ideas blockages and distortions that can only be removed by affirma-
tive social controls."
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CONCLUSION
Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner is an unfortunate decision. The Lloyd
test of "related to" and "adequate alternative forum" conceals more
problems than it resolves. The Lloyd rationale cripples Logan Valley
without attempting to refute its logic. And the Lloyd result, although
perhaps acceptable on the particular facts of the case,56 represents a
rather inflexible approach to the delicate process of accommodating
conflicting rights. Taken together, Logan Valley and Lloyd pose such a
sharp contrast that one is tempted to sympathize with Justice Marshall:
"I am aware," he said, "that the composition of this Court has radically
changed. .... 57
FRANK M. PARKER, JR.
Constitutional Law-Jury Unanimity No Longer Required in State
Criminal Trials
For more than six centuries the common law tradition has required
a unanimous vote of a twelve-man jury to convict an accused in a
criminal proceeding.' The Burger Court, in a pair of sharply divided
opinions, has radically altered that traditional formula. Two years ago,
in Williams v. Florida,2 the Court held that the twelve-man jury panel
is not an indispensable element of the sixth amendment jury trial guar-
antee. A panel of six was found adequate in that case, and the Court
left open the possibility of an even smaller jury in some cases. More
recently, in Apodaca v. Oregon3 and a companion case from Louisiana,
'If, as Justice Powell maintained, respondents could have moved to the sidewalks surrounding
Lloyd Center and reached virtually the same audience as was inside the mall, Lloyd's reversal of
the lower court's decision did not compromise first amendment interests. An inquiry into whether
or not an equally effective forum existed would have been relevant to the balancing of rights
involved. However, the "related to" criterion is immaterial to the balancing process. Furthermore,
its use allows the property owner an unjustified measure of control over the content of the asserted
"speech."
5192 S. Ct. at 2237 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
11. W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 318 (7th ed. 1956); J. THAYER, A PRELIM-
INARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 88-90 (1898).
2399 U.S. 78 (1970).
192 S. Ct. 1628 (1972). The companion case, Johnson v. Louisiana, 92 S. Ct. 1620 (1972),
was originally tried several months before the Court's decision in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968), which held the sixth amendment jury trial right applicable to the states under the due
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the Supreme Court decided that the unanimity requirement was not an
essential element of trial by jury in state criminal proceedings. The
majority, composed of the four Nixon appointees and Justice White
(who announced the decision), upheld convictions by jury votes of ten
to two and nine to three.
The right to trial by jury in criminal cases in the federal courts is
provided by article III, section three and the sixth amendment to the
Constitution. The Court has said that this includes the right to
a trial by jury as understood and applied at common law, and includes
all the essential elements as they were recognized in this country and
England when the Constitution was adopted . . . . Those elements
were- (1) that the jury should consist of twelve men, neither more nor
less; (2) that the jury be in the presence or under the superintendence
of a judge . . . and (3) that the verdict should be unanimous.'
The sixth amendment jury trial guarantee was held applicable to
the states under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
four years ago in Duncan v. Louisiana.5 Justice White, writing for the
Court, held that a defendant had the right to a jury trial in state court
in any case in which he would be entitled to a jury trial in federal court.
At that time the Court was unwilling to express itself as to the future
impact of the Duncan decision on the details of state jury trials, or as
to the applicability to state proceedings of older decisions construing the
sixth amendment:
It seems very unlikely that our decision today will require widespread
changes in state criminal processes. First, our decisions interpreting
the Sixth Amendment are always subject to reconsideration . . . . In
addition, most of the States have provisions for jury trials equal in
breadth to the Sixth Amendment .... I
The Court could have been suggesting that it would not be too
burdensome for the few non-conforming states to put their procedures
process clause. Because the Court held in DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968), that Duncan
was not to be applied retroactively, the Johnson case was not a suitable vehicle for a full expression
of the constitutional status of the unanimity requirement under the sixth amendment. Robert
Apodaca was tried and convicted of assault with a deadly weapon in an Oregon court after Duncan
was decided. The Apodaca case, therefore, squarely presented the question whether the right to
trial by jury in a state court also includes the right to a unanimous verdict.
'Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930).
5391 U.S. 145 (1968).
1d. at 158.
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in line with the federal standard. Or it may have been suggesting that
the sixth amendment would be re-interpreted not to require all the
common law features.
The latter possibility was realized in Williams v. Florida7 when the
Court stripped away as unnecessary one of the standard features of the
common law jury-the twelve-man panel. Mr. Justice White, again
speaking for the majority, articulated a new test to aid in determining
which features of the common law jury are preserved in the sixth amend-
ment: "The relevant inquiry, as we see it, must be the function which
the particular feature performs and its relation to the purposes of a jury
trial."8 Again the Court left open the question of whether the Constitu-
tion required unanimity in state criminal jury verdicts.
In the Apodaca decision the Court finally has faced the issue
squarely and held that jury unanimity is not constitutionally required
for non-capital proceedings in state courts. Although the four Nixon
appointees concurred in the judgment of Justice White's plurality opin-
ion,9 the newcomers did not vote as a cohesive bloc. Justice Powell took
his position between two groups to create shifting majorities.'" He
agreed with Justices White, Burger, Blackmun, and Rehnquist that un-
animity is not constitutionally required in state proceedings," so that the
petitioners' convictions were affirmed; but he sided with the dissenting
Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall in his belief that the
sixth amendment requires a unanimous verdict in federal criminal
trials.' 2 Powell in effect created a bridge between the two groups by
rejecting the doctrine of selective incorporation. 13 This doctrine has
resulted in the ad hoc absorption of the individual guarantees of the Bill
of Rights into the fourteenth amendment, making them applicable to
the states to the same extent they apply to the federal government. 4
7399 U.S. 78 (1970).
sid. at 99.
'This concurrence led the news media to describe the decision as another victory for the
President's "peace forces." N.Y. Times, May 23, 1972, § 1, at 1, col. 1; Tim ., June 5, 1972, at
65.
"92 S. Ct. at 1635 (concurring & dissenting opinion).
"Id. at 1641.
"Id. at 1638.
"Id. at 1637, 1640.
"See generally Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S.
609, 615 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961);
Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALI. L. REv. 929 (1965);
Henkin, "'Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1963).
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Had Justice White been able to win one additional Justice to his
position, unanimous jury verdicts would not be required in federal crimi-
nal trials either. His plurality decision in Apodaca concluded that unan-
imity-like the twelve-man jury requirement-"was not of constitu-
tional stature."' 15 It is not, therefore, a necessary aspect of the sixth
amendment jury."6 Justice Powell refused to go that far. His reading of
the Court's chain of sixth amendment decisions convinced him that in
enacting the amendment the framers desired to preserve the common
law jury, including the unanimity requirement. 7 Therefore, "the Sixth
Amendment requires a unanimous jury verdict to convict in a federal
criminal trial."'18 That requirement is not "so fundamental to the essen-
tials of jury trial," however, as to be binding on the states under the
fourteenth amendment due process clause.19
In holding that conviction by a less-than-unanimous jury does not
violate the sixth amendment jury trial guarantee, Justice White found
the historical evidence inconclusive as to the intent of the framers and
thus turned to other considerations .2 As in his Williams opinion, Justice
White focused upon "the function served by the jury in contemporary
society":
As we said in Duncan, the purpose of trial by jury is to prevent
oppression by the Government by providing a "safeguard against the
corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased,
or eccentric judge." "Given this purpose, the essential feature of a jury
obviously lies in the interposition between the accused and his accuser
of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen .... "I'
Unanimity, concluded Justice White, "does not materially contribute to
the exercise of this commonsense judgment. ' 22
Justice White's one-page analysis of the function of the jury and
the unanimity requirement in the modern American legal system seems
very cursory in light of the widespread acceptance of that requirement.
Certainly, the jury has played an important role as a buffer between the
state and individual citizens, particularly in England and the English
1192 S. Ct. at 1630.
'Old.
"Id. at 1638.
,9ld.
"Id. at 1639.
2Id. at 1632.
2Id. at 1632-33 (citations omitted).
2Id.
19721
NORTH CAROLINA LA W REVIEW
colonies during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries." While that
role is still occasionally applauded today, some observers have sug-
gested that the need for this original virtue of the jury trial has largely
disappeared.2 4 The Court did not even consider an equally important
function of the jury as protector of unpopular minorities from the bias
of the majority.
When members of minority groups-be they racial, religious, or
political-face trial in periods of violent social conflict, the unanimity
requirement is an indispensable check against mob rule. The dissenting
vote of only one or two men can prevent a hasty and unwarranted
conviction. In such a situation, the unpersuaded jurors on a panel may
have been less susceptible to passion and prejudice than the majority;
the true facts may be evident to those few men with cooler heads, while
emotion blinds their fellow jurors. It was to this point that Justice Story
referred when he added the following comment to his discussion of the
jury trial in his famous Commentaries on the Constitution:
The great object of a trial by jury in criminal cases is, to guard against
a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers, and against a
spirit of violence and vindictiveness on the part of the people. Indeed,
it is often more important to guard against the latter than the former
25
Because it requires the concurrence of the unbiased and impartial, the
rule requiring unanimous jury verdicts increases the likelihood that the
guilt or innocence of an accused will be fairly established. As Judge
Brown recently said in condemnation of the Allen charge:26"I think a
"For centuries after the institution of the jury originated toward the end of the thirteenth
century, the right of trial itself was at the King's grace. W. FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY
200 (1852). The jury was essentially a body of witnesses, selected from the local citizenry because
they had personal knowledge of the case, until the time of Henry VI (1422-61). Id. at 159. Thus
the jury was originated to serve the Crown. The accused was not allowed to introduce witnesses in
his own behalf until 1606. The assistance of counsel was allowed defendants accused of treason
only after the Glorious Revolution (1688), and it was not until 1836 that the same privilege was
extended to those accused of other felonies. F. HELLER, THE SIXT H AiENDMENT TO THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES 9-10 (1951). The jury and other sixth amendment rights, therefore,
began to serve and protect the criminal defendant fairly late in the development of the common
law system.
21E.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 188 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
2,2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1780 (5th ed.
(1891).2
'The Allen charge is the traditional formula used by many trial judges in an attempt to urge
an apparently deadlocked jury toward unanimity. It was approved by the Supreme Court in Allen
v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
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mistrial from a hung jury is a safeguard to liberty. In many areas it is
the sole means by which one or a few may stand out against an over-
whelming contemporary public sentiment. Nothing should interfere
with its exercise." 7 Now that less than unanimous jury verdicts have
been approved for state courts, this protection is virtually eliminated.
If a majority of nine or ten jurors can be formed, the majority need not
even consider the arguments of any dissenters. Debate and deliberation
time will almost certainly be reduced.
As Justice Douglas observed in dissent to Apodaca, the result is a
diminution in the reliability of jury verdicts.28 At the close of Apodaca's
trial, for example, the jury deliberated only forty-one minutes before
bringing in a ten-to-two guilty verdict. It seems unlikely that forty-one
minutes was enough time to "piece together the puzzle of historical
truth'2 9 that was the evidence given these jurors during the trial. One
scholar has explained in the following terms his belief that the unanimity
requirement is essential to the proper performance of the jury's func-
tion:
As writers for years have pointed out, the necessity for unanimity lies
in the fact that it is a blending of the ideal and the real, a compromise
of the abstract and the mundanely true. Unanimity requires full and
frank discussion in the jury room. It requires a defense of each juror's
individual viewpoint and a challenging inquiry to those of opposing
view. . . . Weakness or insecurity of the position of a majority of the
jurors is, in some cases, overcome by the logic and justice of a stronger
position which might have been grasped only by a minority. 0
Kalven and Zeisel, foremost scholars of the American jury, report that
examples of a well-reasoned dissident viewpoint being accepted by the
early majority are not uncommon: "In roughly one case in ten, the
minority eventually succeeds in reversing an initial majority, and these
may be cases of special importance. ' 31 But if non-unanimous verdicts
are allowed and deliberation time is thereby shortened, the initial vote
will almost always become the final verdict.
2Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 759 (5th Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 955 (1962).
2192 S. Ct. at 1647.
23d.
31Tamm, The Five-Man Civil Jury: A Proposed Constitutional Amendment, 51 GEo. L.J.
120, 139 (1962).
1 H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 490 (1966).
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Justice White rejected the petitioners' claim that a less-than-
unanimous verdict undercuts the standard of reasonable doubt, which
was recently incorporated into the fourteenth amendment due process
guarantee. 32 The fact that two or three jurors vote to acquit does not
impeach the verdict reached by the majority who voted to convict.3
The Court concluded that the "disagreement of three jurors does not
alone establish reasonable doubt, particularly when such a heavy major-
ity of the jury, after having considered the dissenters' views, remains
convinced of guilt. '34
The Court seems to have overlooked the essence of the interrelation
that has developed between reasonable doubt and unanimity: the deci-
sion to grant the defendant in a criminal trial the benefit of the minority
view of reasonable doubt assures the highest possible degree of cer-
tainty. This is not solely a concession to the accused; it is also a con-
scious sacrifice of efficiency to secure widespread public support for the
judicial process. Western society has judged that it is worse for an
innocent man to be found guilty than for a guilty man to go free. This
social judgment may be, as Kalven and Zeisel suggest, "an almost
heroic commitment to decency," 35 but it is a commitment that flows
from an understanding of the terrible consequences of an err6neous
conviction. The Supreme Court, in holding that due process requires the
reasonable-doubt standard in In re Winship, clearly recognized the pub-
lic demand for near certainty:
Moreover, use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable
to command the respect and confidence of the community in applica-
tions of the criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of the
criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people
in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned."
Unanimity is so ingrained in the common-law procedure that its elimi-
nation would seem to take from the verdict a virtue needed by the
criminal law. The criminal verdict is based on the absence of reasonable
doubt. A dissenting minority of two, three, or more in itself suggests to
the popular mind the existence of a reasonable doubt and impairs public
confidence in the criminal justice system.
"ln re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970).
192 S. Ct. at 1623-24, 1633.
"Id. at 1625.
11H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 31, at 189.
11397 U.S. at 364.
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One of the factors that persuaded the Court to drop the twelve-man
jury panel in Williams v. Florida was the lack of evidence suggesting
that the traditional panel was "necessarily more advantageous to the
defendant" than a six-man jury.37 This phrase implies that the Court
will consider whether a given modification of the common law jury will
tip the scales against the accused as it weighs the constitutionality of the
change. Evidence compiled during Kalven and Zeisel's Chicago Jury
Project 3 clearly indicates that the elimination of the unanimity require-
ment is not a neutral step but a significant detriment to the criminal
defendant.
The Chicago study of 3,576 jury trial cases revealed that the jury
brought in roughly two convictions for every acquittal, so that a defen-
dant normally has a thirty percent chance of acquittal. Almost six per-
cent of all juries, or some three thousand trials per year nationwide, end
in a mistrial following jury deadlock .3 The study revealed that roughly
half of the hung jury cases produce the same practical consequences for
a defendant as an acquittal, either because the prosecution drops his
case or because he is acquitted in a subsequent retrial." A, table indicat-
ing the last votes of hung juries under the then-prevailing unanimity
standard reveals that had a non-unanimous verdict of nine-three been
permitted, almost 500 additional defendants, an increase of thirty-three
percent, might have been convicted every year.4" Furthermore, the evi-
11399 U.S. at 101-02.
wrhis pioneering empirical study provided the basic material for Kalven and Zeisel's book,
supra note 31.
11H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 31, at 56.
411d. at 57 n.4. Kalven and Zeisel caution that this statistic is based on the estimate of an
"experienced prosecutor" rather than a survey of the outcome of actual cases. Id.
41 d. at 460 n.3:
Last Vote of Deadlocked Juries
Vote for Conviction Per Cent
11:1 ................................................. 24
10:2 ................................................. 10
9:3 ................................................. 10
8:4 ................................................. 6
7:5 ................................................. 13
6:6 ................................................. 13
5:7 ................................................. 8
4:8 ................................................. 4
3:9 ................................................. 4
2:10 ................................................. 8
1:11 ..................................................
100%
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dence does not support the claim made by some supporters of the major-
ity verdict that the accused is just as likely to be acquitted by a majority
verdict as he is to be convicted. As noted above, the normal conviction-
acquittal ratio for all jury trials is two to one, whereas had nine-three
verdicts been accepted, the conviction ratio, in the cases of hung juries
studied, would have been almost four to one. Thus, in instances of
divided juries defendants would have a twenty percent chance of acquit-
tal, compared to a thirty percent chance in trials generally. This in-
creased conviction rate is particularly disturbing because defendants
should have a more favorable chance for acquittal in trials resulting in
a non-unanimous verdict. Presumably these are the closest, most diffi-
cult cases, when neither the prosecution nor the jury majority can con-
vince the dissenting jury members to vote for conviction.
The writer does not mean to imply that these figures provide a
completely accurate forecast of the actual effect of allowing less than
unanimous verdicts in every state. These statistics do indicate, however,
that a shift to non-unanimous verdicts would under no circumstances
aid an accused more than it imperiled him. The converse is equally clear;
the unanimity requirement "is necessarily more advantageous to the
defendant" than a mere majority verdict and thus meets the Williams
test.42
When a man's liberty is in the balance, the reliability of the
decision-making process is very important. Therefore it is significant
that probability theory also underscores the value of the unanimous jury
verdict. Speaking in support of the unanimity requirement over fifty
years ago, James Clark asserted: "It is unquestionably true that the
greater the number of persons entertaining a conclusion the greater the
Number of Juries in Sample-48.
The estimates in the text (and they must be understood as being no more than estimates) were
derived from an analysis of the 3000 cases which end in a divided jury annually. See text accompa-
nying note 39 supra. Under the unanimity standard, 1500 of these defendants may be convicted at
a subsequent retrial. See text accompanying note 40 supra. If a 9-3 verdict is allowed, 1320
defendants (44% times 3000) may be convicted at their first trials. See table supra. Approximately
360 defendants (12% times 3000) may be acquitted. See table supra. The remaining 1320 cases
would still end in a mistrial because the jury was not able to meet the new 9-3 minimum standard
of agreement. An additional 660 of these remaining defendants might be convicted at a subsequent
retrial. See text accompanying note 40 supra. Therefore, from the 3000 cases a total of 1980
defendants may be convicted under a 9-3 standard, an increase of 480 from the results under the
unanimity standard.
42399 U.S. at 101-02.
[Vol. 51
JURY UNANIMITY
probability of that conclusion being sound and true."4 Professor For-
syth has confirmed this axiom mathematically. The probability of a
unanimous verdict being right in a hypothetical case is 167776220:1,
that of a majority of eight to four being right, about 256:1, and that of
a majority of seven to five, about 17:1.11 That these figures are not
without meaning is evident from the Louisiana and Oregon
constitutional provisions requiring a unanimous jury verdict only to
convict a defendant of a capital crime.45 Apparently the people of those
two states want to be as certain as possible of guilt before convicting a
defendant of first degree murder, but do not feel it is necessary to be
quite so certain before convicting him of lesser crimes.
Although the unanimity rule has been a feature of Anglo-American
law for six hundred years, the United States is not the only country to
question its continued application under modern conditions. At present
many foreign legal systems, among them former British territories,
allow majority verdicts." Scottish juries are composed of fifteen mem-
bers and for centuries have been able to bring in a simple majority
verdict of eight to seven. 47 Most striking of all, however, is the abandon-
ment of the unanimity requirement in England. The Criminal Justice
Act of 196711 provides that the verdict of a jury in criminal cases need
not be unanimous if in a case where there are twelve or eleven jurors,
ten agree on the verdict, or in a case where there are only ten jurors,
nine agree. The court may not accept a majority verdict of guilty unless
the jury has deliberated for at least two hours.
As far-reaching as the unanimity decision is, the Court has left
open a number of important questions. Probably foremost among these
unresolved issues is the acceptable minimum jury vote. The Court ap-
proved a nine-three verdict, and Justice White emphasized the fact that
a "heavy majority" had voted for conviction.49 Concurring, Justice
Blackmun implied that he would draw the line at eight-four; anything
below that would be unacceptable."0 But in dissent, Justice Stewart
suggested that nothing in the majority's reasoning would prevent states
43Clark, Should Verdicts Be Unanimous in Criminal Cases?, 46 A.B.A. REP. 591, 593 (1921).
11W. FORSYTH, supra note 23, at 210-11 n.1.
'ILA. CONST. art. 7, § 41; ORE. CONST. art. I, § 11.
4
"Samuels, Criminal Justice Act, 31 MODERN L. REV. 16, 25 (1968).
97 J. McDONALD, CRIMINAL LAW OF SCOTLAND 559 (4th ed. 1929).
"
8Crimrinal Justice Act 1967, c. 80, § 13.
4192 S. Ct. at 1625.
"Id. at 1635.
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allowing simple majority (seven-five) verdicts." There is no clue in the
majority decision as to whether juries of less than twelve (allowed under
Williams) must be unanimous. Nor is it clear whether unanimity will
be required in capital cases; all of the defendants whose convictions were
affirmed in Apodaca and the companion cases faced non-capital sent-
ences. Finally, how will the Court justify invalidating convictions
brought in by votes of "three to two, or even two to one," as Justice
Douglas put it?52
The full impact of the decisions will not be evident until the states
respond to the new opportunities opened to them. It should be empha-
sized that the old rule of unanimity still stands in the federal courts.
Although they handle only a tiny fraction of all criminal trials, the
federal courts are the fora for some of the nation's most dramatic and
difficult cases-particularly the federal conspiracy charges,"3 so popu-
lar of late with the Justice Department. Most criminal trials take place
in the state courts,54 and it is there that changes will be felt. Most
observers believe that many states will alter their criminal procedures
to take advantage of the less than unanimous jury verdict.5 As indicated
above, a slightly higher conviction rate may be expected.56 Concomi-
tantly, state prosecutors may enjoy whatever benefits accrue from" a few
more guilty pleas and a greater willingness to plea-bargain on the part
of criminal defendants. Despite the anguished cries of the dissenters that
the majority has "cut the heart out of" the jury trial,57 the decision can
affect at most only five or six percent of all criminal trials. Over ninety-
four percent result in clearcut conviction or acquittal-without jury
disagreement-under the old unanimity rule.5" Furthermore, only a tiny
fraction of all criminal defendants ask for trial-no more than fifteen
"1d. at 1627.
5292 S. Ct. at 1649.
'18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970).
f"See Friendly, supra note 14, at 936 n.40, pointing out that in 1963 the Supreme Court and
County Courts of New York handled the cases of 19,888 criminal defendants, and the state's lowest
courts handled an additional 452,271 felonies and misdemeanors. During approximately the same
period, the federal district courts in New York disposed of 1,8 16 criminal cases.
OSee sources cited note 9 supra.
"5See text accompanying notes 38-42 supra.
5792 S. Ct. at 1651 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
5H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 31, at 453. Of this 6% of deadlocked juries, just over
half contain one, two, or three dissenting jurors. If the Court does draw the line at 9-3 verdicts
(see text accompanying notes 49-51 supra), the unanimity decisions will affect some 3% of all
criminal trials annually.
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percent." Unlike the rulings on the right to counsel," search and sei-
zure,"' or coerced confession, 2 for example, which affected most crimi-
nal defendants, the Apodaca decision will directly touch only one of
every one or two hundred defendants. Its psychic impact on the Ameri-
can system of justice may be more difficult to measure.
THOMAS A. LEMLY
Environmental Law-Substantive Judicial Review Under The National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)' sets
forth a declaration of national environmental policy (section 101)2 and
establishes procedural requirements for governmental agencies when-
ever a major Federal activity which will have a major impact on the
environment is undertaken (section 102). 3 These procedural require-
ments include the compilation of information and submission of an
environmental impact statement to the Council on Environmental Qual-
ity before any work on a major federal project is begun. Section 102
"Id. at 17-18.
c°Argersinger v. Hamlin, 92 S. Ct. 2006 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
81Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
"Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
'42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
242 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970):
(a) The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the inter-
relations of all components of the natural environment, particularly the profound influ-
ences of population growth, high-density urbanization, industrial expansion, resource
exploitation, and new and expanding technological advances and recognizing further the
critical importance of restoring and maintaining environmental quality to the overall
welfare and development of man, declares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal
Government, in cooperation with State and local governments, and other concerned
public and private organizations, to use all practicable means and measures, including
financial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and promote the
general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist
in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of
present and future generations of Americans.
(b) In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is the continuing
responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, consistent with
other essential considerations of national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal
plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may-
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environ-
ment for succeeding generations;
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has consistently been held to be a ground on which to base judicial
review of an administrative agency's action.' Environmentalists have
been quick to utilize the courts to enforce as stringently as possible the
procedural requirements of NEPA in cases involving agency actions
which have ranged from nuclear warhead tests5 to the attempted aban-
donment of a railroad line.' As a result of this active social concern on
the part of groups and individuals, most agencies have realized that
compliance with section 102 is necessary. However, many agencies now
seem to be reluctantly seeking to comply with the letter, but not the
spirit of NEPA. In these cases environmentalists have turned to section
101 in their efforts to enforce the policy of NEPA. This note will deal
with the controversy over judicial review of administrative actions under
section 101,7 specifically focusing on the case of Conservation Council
of North Carolina v. Froehlke.
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically
and culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without
degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended conse-
quences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our na-
tional heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports
diversity and variety of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will per-
mit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and
(6) enchance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maxi-
mum attainable recycling of depletable resources.
(c) The Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a healthful environ-
ment and that each person has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation and
enhancement of the environment.
342 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
4See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d
1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 165 (D.D.C.
1971), aftd, 3 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1558 (4th Cir. Jan. 13, 1972).
5Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 3 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
6City of New York v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
7For a clear recognition of the distinctions between procedural and substantive judicial review
see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). There the court stated
that an agency's action is to be set aside if it fails to meet statutory, procedural, or constitutional
requirements (procedural review), or if the action was not supported by "substantial evidence" or
was "unwarranted by the facts" (substantive review). The latter involves a "searching and careful"
inquiry into the facts, but the court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency. Id. at 414, 416. In addition, see Cohen & Warren, Judicial Recognition of the Substantive
Requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 13 B.C. IND. & CoMt. L. Riv.
685 (1972).
$340 F. Supp. 222 (M.D.N.C.), affd mem., 4 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1044 (4th Cir. May 2, 1972).
SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW UNDER NEPA
On December 30, 1963, Congress authorized a "project for the
comprehensive development of the Cape Fear River Basin," 9 North
Carolina's largest river basin. This development, designated New Hope
Lake, was to be created by an earthen dam to be built upstream from
the point where the Deep River and the Haw River join to form the
Cape Fear River. The lake to be formed by the dam would cover a total
of 14,300 acres. 0 The land within this projected pool is primarily wood-
land and farms. The woodland is made up of hardwoods mixed with
pine, and the chief crops produced are corn, cotton, tobacco, and pas-
ture grasses."'
The purposes of the dam include flood control, water supply, water
quality control, general recreation, and fish and wildlife enhancement.
The original cost of the New Hope project was to be 44.5 million dollars
but was later revised to fifty-three million dollars. Ground breaking
occurred on December 7, 1970, and as of September, 1971, fifty-four
percent of the land had been acquired and twenty-two percent of the
work completed with total cost as of that date of 16.9 million dollars.'"
On August 10, 1971, the Conservation Council of North Carolina
brought an action in United States District Court for the Middle Dis-
trict of North Carolina seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against
the construction of the New Hope Dam by the United States Army
Corps of Engineers. This action, Conservation Council of North Caro-
lina v. Froehlke,13 came before Chief Judge Eugene A. Gordon who on
February 14, 1972, issued a memorandum order denying plaintiffs'
motion for a preliminary injunction.'
The heart of the New Hope case involved the court's denial of
substantive review under section 101.I1 NEPA, in the opinion of the
9Act of Dec. 30, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-253, 77 Stat. 841.
1 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE NEW
HOPE LAKE, NORTH CAROLINA PROJECT 1 (1970).
"Id. at 6.
"Conservation Council of North Carolina v. Froehlke, 340 F. Supp. 222, 224 (M.D.N.C.),
affd mer., 4 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1044 (4th Cir. May 2, 1972).
"Id.
"Id. at 228.
"Specifically, plaintiffs contended, inter alia, that:
(I) the defendants had given insufficient consideration to alternatives to the project in that
the environmental impact statement merely listed certain alternatives without sufficiently discuss-
ing them;
(2) the environmental impact statement failed to meet the requirements of section 102(2)(c)
because it omitted consideration of two future nuclear power plants to be constructed downstream
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court, does not provide such review, but only establishes procedures with
which government agencies must comply: "[T]hese requirements pro-
vide only procedural remedies instead of substantive rights, and the
function of the court is to insure that the requirements are met. '"'6 Tile
court relied on several cases in support of its conclusion that the judici-
ary is powerless to substitute its own opinion as to whether or not a
project should be undertaken.
Probably the clearest support for the court's decision in Froehlke
is found in Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers.7 There
the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the damming of the Cossatot River in
Arkansas by the Corps of Engineers, basing their action on both section
101 and section 102 of NEPA. The court refused the injunction and
expressly denied the existence of substantive review under section 101:
[NEPA] appears to reflect a compromise which, in the opinion of
the Court, falls short of creating the type of "substantive rights"
claimed by the plaintiffs. . . . If the Congress had intended to leave
it to the courts to determine such matters [prohibition of the dam]; if,
indeed, it had intended to give up its own prerogative and those of the
executive agencies in this respect, it certainly would have used explicit
language to accomplish such a far-reaching objective'
In Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin'9 plaintiffs sought to
enjoin the Secretary of Agriculture from undertaking a cooperative
federal-state program to control the fire ant population in the southeast-
ern United States by spraying insecticides. Plaintiffs based their action
on allegations that the defendant failed to satisfy the substantive and
procedural requirements of NEPA. In denying the preliminary injunc-
tion the court limited its review to the procedural aspects of NEPA,
saying: "Thus in reviewing the Department of Agriculture program
under consideration here, the Court will not substitute its judgment for
from the dam and the effect of a proposed extension of Interstate Highway 40 which will transect
one of the wildlife sub-impoundments planned for the project;
(3) the ratio of the costs of the project to its benefits had been exaggerated in the following
areas: interest rate and project life, nutrient removal costs, flood control benefits, water quality
benefits, water supply and recreational benefits.
See Brief for Plaintiffs, Conservation Council of North Carolina v. Froehlke, 340 F. Supp. 222
(M.D.N.C. 1972).
"1340 F. Supp. at 225.
1325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
1Id. at 755.
"325 F. Supp. 1401 (D.D.C. 1971).
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that of the Secretary on the merits of the proposed program but will
require that the Secretary comply with the procedural requirements of
[NEPA]." 0
Froehlke also held that the purpose of judicial review under NEPA
is to insure that the procedural requirements are met, that is, that the
environmental impact statement is complete, thus allowing Congress
and the President to consider the evidence presented and decide on the
desirability and feasibility of the project.
It is clear that NEPA was not intended to be a means for the
Courts to second guess congressional appropriations, but was intended
to be a means of disclosing to Congress and other decisionmakers all
environmental factors in order that decisions and appropriations could
be made with as little adverse effect on the environment as possible.21
The immediate result of the Froehlke decision was denial of the
plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. This order was affirmed
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.22 At
present the case is before Judge Gordon on cross-motions for summary
judgment.
The principle in Froehlke has been followed in at least two cases:
Pizitz v. Volpe 23 and Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of
Engineers.24 In the latter case plaintiffs challenged construction of
Alabama's Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway, basing some of their
allegations on section 101 in much the same manner as the plaintiffs in
211d. at 1404.
2340 F. Supp. at 228. Support for this is found in Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v.
Seaborg, 3 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1971). There the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit refused to enjoin, under NEPA, nuclear tests on Amchitka Island,
saying the court's "function is only to assure that the statement sets forth the opposing scientific
views, and does not take the arbitrary and impermissible approach of completely omitting ...
any responsible scientific opinions concerning possible adverse environmental effects." Id. at 1128-
29. Other cases concurring in the basic holding include: Bradford Township v. Highway Authority,
4 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1301 (7th Cir. June 22, 1972); McQueary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608 (10th Cir.
1971) (limited to cases involving national security); National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d
650 (10th Cir. 1971). The latter case presents an interesting quirk in that the provisions of NEPA
are invoked, not by an environmental group but by several large oil companies, to prevent the
federal government from discontinuing the purchase of helium from them. In the district court's
words, it was "passing strange" to see the giants of the oil and gas industry representing the public
interest. Id. at 654.
24 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1044 (4th Cir. May 2, 1972) (mem.).
2'4 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1195 (M.D. Ala. May 1, 1972).
24 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1408 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 4, 1972).
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Froehlke. The Mississippi court cited Froehlke in support of its holding
that:
Courts do not sit to decide the substantive merits or demerits of
a federal undertaking under NEPA, but only to make certain that the
responsible federal agency, in this case the Corps of Engineers, makes
full disclosure of environmental consequences to the decisionmakers.
While the exact scope of § 101 has not been defined by the Supreme
Court, the prevailing view of the federal courts is that neither this
section nor other provisions of NEPA create substantive rights that are
enforceable in the courts.?'
Notwithstanding these decisions, several courts have engaged in
substantive judicial review under section 101 and to that extent are in
disagreement with the ruling of the Froehlke court. In one such case,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded
that "reviewing courts probably cannot reverse a substantive decision
on its merits, under Section 101, unless it be shown that the actual
balance of costs and benefits that was struck was arbitrary or clearly
gave insufficient weight to environmental values.' 2
Furthermore, in Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Fed-
eral Power Commission,27 one of the two 28 most recent recent develop-
ments in the litigation over Consolidated Edison's plan to construct a
pumped storage hydro-electric project at Storm King Mountain on the
Hudson River, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit construed
section 101 as requiring the detailed and exhaustive consideration of
environmental factors required by that court when it remanded the same
case to the Federal Power Commission five years prior.29 These require-
ments included detailed substantive review by the court of alternate
plans to the project and of the project's impact on "the conservation of
natural resources, the maintenance of natural beauty, and the preserva-
'Id. at 1413.
2 Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, I115
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
'453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 92 S. Ct. 2453 (1972).
'The other being deRham v. Diamond, 69 Misc. 2d 1, 330 N.Y.S.2d 71 (Sup. Ct. 1972), a
case not involving NEPA but a clear example of substantive judicial review in that the New York
Supreme Court held that the New York Commissioner of Environmental Conservation acted "in
excess of his authority and in violation of law" in certifying that the Storm King project complied
with state water quality standards. Id. at _., 330 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
z'Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
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tion of historic sites."30 The court said that "the policy statement in
Section 101 envisions the very type of full consideration and balancing
of various factors which we, by our remand order, required the Commis-
sion to undertake."
31
Similarly, in National Resources Defense Council v. Morton32 an
injunction was granted banning the sale of oil and gas leases on the outer
continental shelf off eastern Louisiana. The court reviewed the sub-
stance of the environmental impact statement and found that "the de-
fendants only superficially discussed the alternatives listed in the Final
Impact Statement, and they failed to discuss in detail the environmental
impacts of the alternatives they listed in the statement. ' ':13
In Hanly v. Mitchell34 the Second Circuit again recognized
NEPA's substantive review provision. The General Services Adminis-
tration (GSA) was required to submit an environmental impact state-
ment covering the proposed construction of a federal jail in a neighbor-
hood of New York City containing several government buildings and
two apartment complexes which housed fifty thousand people. The
court found the GSA's action "arbitrary and capricious ' '3 5 in not con-
sidering all relevant factors in making its determination that an environ-
mental impact statement was not necessary. The statement should
include a "hard look at the particular environmental impact of squeez-
ing a jail into a narrow area directly across the street from two large
apartment houses."13' The court issued a preliminary injunction and
remanded the case to GSA for a "proper determination, . . . taking
account of all relevant factors, of whether the proposed jail significantly
affects the quality of the human environment. ' 37
In Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures v. United
States38 the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief against the Interstate
'Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 453 F.2d 463, 469 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 92 S. Ct. 2453 (1972).
3
'Id. at 481.
323 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1558 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 13, 1972).
331d. at 1560.
314 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1152 (2d Cir. May 17, 1972). This case originally involved only proce-
dural review under section 102(2)(c) since GSA contended that an impact statement was not
necessary. However a short impact statement was ultimately submitted. The court discussed the
procedural aspects in ruling that an impact statement was required and discussed the substantive
aspects in finding the impact statement insufficient.
"Id. at 1157.
'
2Id. at 1156.
"Id. at 1158.
4 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1312 (D.D.C. July 10, 1972), stay denied sub nom. Aberdeen R.R. v.
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Commerce Commission, which had ordered a 2.5 percent surcharge to
the normal tariff on all rail freight. The challenge was based on the
theory that this surcharge increased the cost of shipping recyclable ma-
terials, thus discouraging the environmentally desirable use of recycla-
ble goods to the extent that an environmental impact statement was
required under NEPA. The ICC had stated that the environmental
impact of this surcharge was "unclear. ' 39 Its statement had also exam-
ined alternatives to the increase "in extremely cursory fashion."4 The
court agreed with the plaintiffs that improper consideration was given
to the environmental impact and issued relief.
There is obviously a great difference of opinion over the availability
of review under section 101. Several courts have engaged in substantive
review under NEPA, but none have specifically and comprehensively
discussed it in their opinions. However, a closer look at the facts of the
New Hope case reveal that it was an ideal vehicle for such an undertak-
ing.
It has been decided that in reviewing an agency action under
NEPA, the reviewing court cannot substitute its own judgment for that
of the agency. 4 However, the court can reverse a substantive agency
decision which has been based on an arbitrary balance of costs and
benefits or insufficient consideration of environmental factors. 2 The
facts of the New Hope case presented a clear case for finding an arbi-
trary cost-benefit balance and a lack of consideration of environmental
factors.
Three areas will be considered here to show that the cost-benefit
ratio was improper and therefore, should have been subject to judicial
review. The first factor to be considered is the cost of nutrient removal.
The environmental impact statement submitted by the Corps of Engi-
neers expressed concern over nutrient enrichment of the lake and possi-
ble algae blooms which may occur.43 Yet the analysis of the project by
the Corps of Engineers included no costs for the necessary removal of
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 41 U.S.L.W. 2068 (Burger,Circuit Justice,
July 19, 1972).
"Id. at 1315.
401d.
"Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
42 d.
41 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, supra note 10, at 21-22.
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these nutrients.44 Thus the entire cost of the project had not been shown.
Secondly, in determining the amount of benefit from flood control,
the Corps of Engineers determined flood frequency by using flood data
for the region in which the project is located.45 The method of calculat-
ing flood frequency used here by the Corps of Engineers" requires that
local data be used if available; otherwise regional data is acceptable. 47
Local data was available in this case4" but was not used. Plaintiffs'
expert witness, Dr. Edward H. Wiser, in his deposition, stated that use
of local rather than regional data would reduce the estimate of flood
control benefits from 2,094,000 dollars (as estimated by the Corps of
Engineers) to 938,800 dollars annually" and cause a corresponding drop
in the cost-benefit ratio.
A final consideration is the potential recreational benefits of the
project. In determining the dollar value of recreational benefits, the
environmental impact statement used an admission price of fifty-five
cents per person and placed the average number of man-days of recrea-
tion per year at 2,760,000.10 This latter figure is probably derived from
an estimation of the total possible number of man-hours of recreation
that the lake could provide." It is very unlikely that the lake will be filled
to recreational capacity every day of its existence.
Froehlke not only failed to utilize the opportunity to interpret
NEPA as allowing substantive judicial review but virtually emasculated
NEPA, leaving only the shell of the statute which was designed to
establish and enforce a national environmental policy. For example,
Froehlke held that the project in question need not be more environmen-
tally desirable than those alternatives to the project which are required
to be listed in the environmental impact statement .5 After Froehlke the
"See id.
"Id. at 81.
"The log-Pearson Type III Method. For a discussion of this calculation see 3 id. at 321-64.
"Id. at 343.
"Id. The preliminary impact statements included no mention of local data. There the flood
control frequency was based on regional data. However, Dr. Wiser's deposition, in which the local
data was discussed, was included in the final impact statement even though the determination of
flood frequency was not changed to reflect the local data.
"Id. at 341-42.
'I Id. at 18, 28.
"The Corps of Engineers gave no explanation of the source of this figure. However, plaintiffs
understood it to be based on this estimation. Interview with Thomas Schoenbaum, counsel for
plaintiffs, in Chapel Hill, N.C., Aug. 1, 1972.
"1340 F. Supp. at 228.
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reviewing court would be powerless to act where the agency had gone
through the formality of listing the alternatives, thus complying with the
procedural requirements of section 102(2)(c). This leaves NEPA with
no muscle to halt an undesirable project after the agency has "filled in
the blanks" by simply listing the alternatives.
Finally, the facts of Froehlke indicate that the inadequacies and
inaccuracies of the environmental impact statement were so great as to
constitute a breach of the procedural as well as the substantive require-
ments of NEPA. The court did not insist upon the detailed considera-
tion of the project that is required by NEPA. Instead it accepted the
self-serving description of the project presented by the Corps of Engi-
neers which casually dismissed many of New Hope's costs and adverse
effects while relying on exaggerated benefits. The inadequate considera-
tion of the alternatives to the project also amounted to noncompliance
with section 102. Section 102 implicitly requires that the reports of
alternatives be complete and accurate. NEPA does not contemplate the
submission of misleading reports. When inaccurate reports are submit-
ted the agency has not even met the procedural requirements of NEPA.
This case could have become the cornerstone of substantive judicial
review under NEPA without breaching the traditional limits on judicial
power. Without doubt, substantive judicial review conjures up visions
of the court completely disregarding a reasonable and well-supported
administrative decision by substituting its own subjective beliefs and
preferences. Agencies on occasion fail to fully consider the
environmental impact of their programs and projects. Section 101
should be interpreted as providing a judicial solution to such situations
without unduly restricting agency discretion.
STEPHEN T. SMITH
Income Taxation-Deductibility of Employment Agency Fees
Within the last few years executive level employees have been seek-
ing new employment as frequently as blue-collar workers.' In a highly
specialized technological or administrative field, employment opportun-
ities are rare, and it is frequently necessary for the job seeker to engage
'Tucker, An Individual's Employment-Seeking Expenses: Analyzing the New Judicial
Climate, 34 J. TAx. 352 (1971).
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the services of an executive employment agency. Is the fee which is paid
to an employment agency or referral service a deductible business ex-
pense2when the agency is unsuccessful in its efforts to locate a new
employment? The Tax Court, in Leonard F. Cremona,3 a decision by
the full court, recently held that the deduction no longer depends upon
whether a new job was actually obtained by the employment agency.
Now the only determination4 is whether the new job is, or would have
been, in the same trade or business in which the employee was working
at the time of the expense. 5
Leonard F. Cremona contracted with Harvard Executive Research
Center, Inc., to pay a fee of $1,500 for job counseling and referral
services concerning available corporate administrative employment
opportunities. No new job was obtained' and Cremona continued to be
employed by the same corporation in the same administrative capacity
as when he first contracted the employment agency. Cremona believed
that there was still a possibility of future job offers although the employ-
ment agency's service had terminated.
The Tax Court held that the dmployment agency fee was a deducti-
ble expense since it was a good faith effort to improve the job opportuni-
ties in the trade or business in which the employee was engaged prior
2INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a) states:
"(a) IN GENERAL-There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business.
Id. § 212, states:
"In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year-
(1) for the production or collection of income .... "
In Leonard F. Cremona, 58 T.C. 219, P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEc. (58 P-H TAX CT.
Rep.) 1 58.20 (May 4, 1972), and David J. Primuth, 54 T.C. 374 (1970), the Tax Court found the
expense to be deductible under § 162 and refrained from discussing the possibility that a deduction
might also be allowed under § 212.
158 T.C. 219, P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. (58 P-H Tax Ct. Rep.) 1 58.20 (May 4,
1972).
41d. Although the court discusses only the requirement that the expense must be for seeking
employment in the same trade or business, the discussion of United States v. Generes, 92 S. Ct.
827 (1972), in this note indicates that an additional determination may be required in the future.
See note 39 & accompanying text infra.
51d. at 222, P-H TAX CT. REP. & MENM. DEC. at 153. See also Gale C. Huber, 39 P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 1047 (1970), which held that expenses incurred by unemployed persons are business
expenses since those persons are still in the same trade or business of being a particular type of
employee.
6The S1,500 fee was nevertheless paid because it was not contingent on securing a new job.
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to the expenditure. 7 The court stated that outside factors, such as eco-
nomic conditions in the field in which Cremona sought to obtain a new
job, should not determine deductibility.8
After David J. Primuth,0 in 1970, there was a two-part test to
determine the deductibility of employment agency fees. First, the new
employment had to be within the same trade or business in which the
person had been previously employed; secondly, the expenses had to be
for securing a job rather than for merely seeking one.
The requirement that the new job had to be in the same trade or
business as the old job relates to section 1621° of the Internal Revenue
Code. Because a deduction under section 162 is not allowed for expenses
incurred prior to going into a business," the business had to have existed
at the time the expense was incurred. Thus, an employment fee for
changing from one trade or business to another would not have been
deductible since it did not involve carrying on the old trade or business,
and the new trade or business had not yet begun.
For many years, the courts have recognized that a person may be
in the trade of being in a particular profession. Teachers, 3 engineers,"
and even corporate executives15 have been recognized as persons engag-
ing in a trade or business. This concept has been expanded to the point
that expenses incurred by persons who were unemployed have been
allowed as deductible business expenses because they were still in the
758 T.C. at 222, P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEm. DEc. at 153. The Tax Court was willing to
accept the taxpayer's contention that he was in the trade or business of being an "administrator."
If such broad categories are considered a trade or business in the future, the possible difficulties
in obtaining a business expense deduction for employment agency fees which are discussed in this
note will be substantially reduced.
8Id.
954 T.C. 374 (1970). The taxpayer in Primuth was secretary-treasurer of one corporation and
paid a noncontingent fee to an employment agency. As a result of the efforts of the agency, the
taxpayer accepted employment with another corporation as controller and assistant to the vice
president of finance. The new employment was held to be in the same trade or business and the
business expense deduction was allowed under § 162(a).
"See note 2 supra.
"Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir. 1965). In this case
expenses of a television corporation to train personnel several years before receiving an operation
license were denied. These expenses were not incurred in "carrying on a trade or business" as
required by § 162.
"E.g., Furner v. Commissioner, 393 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1968); Harold A. Christensen, 17 T.C.
1456 (1952).
'Furner v. Commissioner, 393 F.2d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 1968).
"Kenneth R. Kenfield, 54 T.C. 1197, 1199 (1970).
"David J. Primuth, 54 T.C. 374, 379 (1970).
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trade or business of being a particular type of employee."6 However,
some judges have expressed a desire to limit this concept severely by
restricting the taxpayer's business to being an employee for the particu-
lar employer for whom he is working.' 7 Consequently, expenses in seek-
ing a job with a new employer would not be deductible because the new
employment would be another trade or business and nearly all employ-
ment agency fee deductions would be destroyed. Fortunately, this con-
ception has yielded to a broad trade or business test such as that utilized
in Cremona."
The second requirement for the deductibility of employment
agency fees prior to Cremona was that the expense had to be for secur-
ing rather than seeking a job. 9 Thejob-seeking and job-securing distinc-
tion was initially evoked in Office Decision 579 in 1920, 0 which stated
that fees paid to secure employment would be allowed as a deduction.
Revenue Ruling 60-158,21 however, specifically stated that all fees paid
to employment agencies were not deductible. In the same year, Revenue
Ruling 60-22322 revoked Revenue Ruling 60-158 and stated that "the
Internal Revenue Service will continue to allow deductions for fees paid
to employment agencies for securing employment." Although the Serv-
ice, through a series of Revenue Rulings, stated that it would only allow
employment agency fees paid for securing a job to be deducted as a
business expense, it made no attempt to develop guidelines to determine
whether a fee was paid for seeking or for securing a job.
In Thomas W. Ryan,23 an employment agency fee was disallowed
as a business expense deduction even though evidence was presented that
the final part of the fee was contingent upon the acquisition of a new
job and that a new job was obtained. Ryan was required to pay a $250
retainer to the employment agency and a $250 final fee contingent upon
the acquisition of a new job. The Tax Court disallowed the retainer as
being an expense for seeking a new job and then disallowed the contin-
gent fee because of lack of proof of payment. This different reason for
denying the final fee was an early indication that the tax court would
"
6Gale C. Huber, 39 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1047 (1970).
"David J. Primuth, 54 T.C. 374, 384 (1970) (Tietjens, J., dissenting).
I8See note 7 supra.
"David J. Primuth, 54 T.C. 374, 380 (1970).
103 Cum. BULL. 130 (1920).
11960-1 CUm. BULL. 140.
211960-1 CUM. BULL. 57.
228 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 506 (1959).
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distinguish contingent employment agency fees from those which were
paid regardless of whether new employment was obtained.
After Ryan, the Service had argued that deductions for contingent
fees were allowable if the job were actually obtained as a result of the
efforts of the employment agency, 4 but fees paid whether or not the
agency was successful in obtaining employment were for job-seeking,
not job-securing, and were not deductible even if employment was ob-
tained.25 In Primuth this argument was again made, but the Tax Court
found this a "distinction without a difference."2 The purpose and re-
sults of the payments were said by the court to be the same in either
event. The employment agency had practically guaranteed Primuth that
they would find a new job for him .2 Therefore the existence of noncon-
tingent fee did not preclude deductibility so long as the taxpayer was
successful in obtaining a new job in the same trade or business.
The requirement that employment be secured was expanded still
further by Kenneth R. Kenfield.28 In Kenfield, the taxpayer paid a
noncontingent employment agency fee and accepted a new job in the
same trade or business found for him by the employment agency. How-
ever, the taxpayer reconsidered, declined the new job offer, and decided
to remain at this old job because he was given a raise and a promotion.
The Tax Court found that the promotion and raise given by his old
employer was a direct consequence of the new job offer and allowed the
employment fee as a business expense deduction. 29 This case moved the
Tax Court one step closer to completely abandoning the requirement
that the employee must be successful in his attempt to find a new job.
The job-securing half of the two-part test for deductibility has now
been removed by Cremona. The job sought still must be in the same
trade or business, but it does not actually have to be secured before the
"In Carson J. Morris, 36 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1424 (1967), affd, 423 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1970),
an employment agency fee was denied as a business expense deduction because the new job resulted
from the efforts of the taxpayer rather than from those of the employment agency. The court felt
that this was an indication that the fee was for seeking rather than for securing new employment.
2Francois Louis, 35 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1174, 1177-1178 (1966): "While the effect of such
rulings and instructions is not entirely clear, it seems that they would allow as deductions payments
(to employment agencies and perhaps others) for having secured employment for the taxpayer, but
would disallow as deductions amounts paid for seeking employment which are payable irrespective
of whether employment is secured."
2854 T.C. at 380.
2Id.
- 54 T.C. 1197 (1970).
21d. at 1200.
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business deduction is allowed. Does the new test allow a deduction if
the title or description of the new job is the same as that of the old job,
or must the basic skills which are to be used in the new job also be the
same as those used in the old one? Although the requirement that the
new employment must be in the same trade or business existed prior to
Cremona," its coexistence with the job-securing requirement prevented
any thorough development of this test because the deduction could be
denied solely on the basis of failure to secure new employment.
The Commissioner sought to distinguish Cremona from prior 31
cases which had allowed an employment agency fee as a deduction by
citing Eugene A. Carter-2 in which the taxpayer was not successful in
obtaining a new job and the deduction was disallowed. Carter was held
not applicable by the court because the taxpayer in Carter sought to
obtain a job in a different trade or business.3 Prior to Cremona, there
seem to be no significant cases which denied the deductibility of employ-
ment agency fees solely on the basis that the new job was not in the same
trade or business. It would seem that the uncertainty which has devel-
oped in applying the same trade or business test to business deductions
for educational expelses has now been injected into the area of employ-
ment agency fee deductions.34
The post-Cremona taxpayer who incurs expenses in obtaining a
new job which carries a slightly different job title or requires somewhat
different skills or a higher degree of the same skills 5 cannot be certain
that he will be allowed a business expense deduction. It is possible that
such a person, due to the prior lack of emphasis which was placed on
the requirement that the new job be in the same trade or business, would
"E.g., Eugene A. Carter, 51 T.C. 932 (1969).
3'E.g., Kenneth R. Kenfield, 54 T.C. 1197 (1970); Guy R. Motto, 54 T.C. 558 (1970); David
J. Primuth, 54 T.C. 374 (1970).
3251 T.C. 932 (1969).
"58 T.C. at 221, P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. at 152.
"The test which is used to determine the deductibility of education costs as a business expense
is whether the expense was incurred to maintain employment or proficiency in the same trade or
business. The same trade-or-business test, as used in the education expense business deduction
cases, has been characterized by uncertainty. Compare, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 210 F. Supp.
597 (N.D. Ohio 1962), affdper curiam, 329 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1964), which held that an Internal
Revenue agent could have a business deduction for his expenses in going to law school even though
he quit his job shortly after graduating, with James J. Engel, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1441 (1962),
which held that a law degree qualified an Internal Revenue agent for a new profession and that a
business deduction would not be allowed for the costs of going to school.
'-See 58 T.C. at 224, P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEc. at 154 (Sterrett, J., concurring).
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have been allowed a business expense deduction prior to Cremona but
may not be allowed such a deduction in the future. Since there is now
only one criterion for the deductibility of employment agency fees,
judges may feel compelled to apply it more strictly. Consequently, the
new job may be required to involve exactly the same duties, rather than
merely the same basic skills, as the old job. The Tax Court may no
longer consider an unemployed person to be engaged in a particular
trade or business. 6 There are many ways in which the same trade or
business test could be modified by judicial interpretation so as to disal-
low deductions which had previously been allowed in situations in which
the taxpayer was successful in obtaining new employment.
Another problem may be presented when the taxpayer has paid an
employment agency fee but has been unsuccessful in obtaining new
employment. A determination of the type of new employment which the
taxpayer was seeking would have to be made before there could be any
determination whether the job sought would constitute a new trade or
business. If the taxpayer was seeking new employment which was not
the same as his present trade or business, the deduction seemingly would
be disallowed. Even though the requirement that a new job must be
secured no longer exists, the business expense deduction apparently
would be allowed only for a good faith effort to secure employment in
the same" trade or business.
An even more difficult situation would be the one in which the
taxpayer not only would be willing to accept new employment in the
same trade or business in which he is presently employed but also would
be willing to accept employment in a different trade or business. Such
a consideration would seem to call for a determination of the dominant
desires in seeking new employment. It would be impossible to deter-
mine, with any degree of exactness, whether the taxpayer wanted em-
ployment in a new trade or business more than he wanted new employ-
ment in the same trade or business. Faced with the difficulty of this
determination, the Tax Court might restrict deductions in this area by
disallowing the employment agency fee when the taxpayer is willing to
accept employment in a field other than his present trade or business
but is unsuccessful in obtaining either. If the taxpayer was willing to
accept employment in a field other than his trade or business and was
"See note 16 supra.
358 T.C. at 222, P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. at 153.
[Vol. 51
EMPLOYMENT AGENCY FEES
unsuccessful in getting a new job, then, under the rigid interpretation
suggested above, he would be in the same position as he would have been
before Cremona since the deduction would have been denied because no
new job was obtained. Furthermore, the taxpayer might be in a less
desirable position after Cremona if he had expressed a willingness to
accept employment either in his present trade or business or in some
other field and then acquired new employment in his present trade or
business. The deduction would have been allowed prior to Cremona
since he obtained new employment in the same trade or business. But
the expense might now be disallowed because the taxpayer was willing
to accept employment in some other trade or business when he incurred
the expense. At present there is no way to determine the manner in
which the Tax Court will treat a willingness to accept employment in
some other trade or business. Although the same trade or business test
was frequently mentioned prior to Cremona, the decisions had been
made largely on the basis of a failure to secure a new job.3"
The general area of business purpose was discussed in United
States v. Generes,39 a recent Supreme Court decision which held that
a business expense will be allowed only if the trier of fact determines
that the dominant motive for the claimed business expenditure was a
business purpose. Cremona requires that the expense must be for at-
tempting to find a new job in the same trade or business. The determina-
tion in both Generes and Cremona concerns business purpose. Generes
involves the entire area of business purpose while Cremona requires that
a specific business purpose, to find a job in the same trade or business,
must be present. Generes could affect the outcome of future cases in
which employment agency fee deductions are sought since the specific
business purpose required by Cremona could be present-while the domi-
nant motive, which Generes requires must be a business purpose, might
be lacking. References to Generes and its possible impact upon
Cremona were made in two of the concurring opinions in Cremona."
Judge Tannenwald, with whom two judges agreed, and Judge Sterrett
indicated that Generes may have a restrictive influence on employment
agency fee deductions. They stated that the majority's same trade or
business determination, combined with the dominant motive require-
"E.g., Eugene v. Carter, 51 T.C. 932 (1969).
1192 S. Ct. 827 (1972).
458 T.C. at 223-24, P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEm. DEc. at 154 (Tannenwald & Sterrett, JJ.,
concurring).
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ment in Generes, was sufficient to prevent an unduly broad allowance
of deductions in this area. An example of the effect which the Generes
opinion could have upon Cremona would be if a taxpayer paid an em-
ployment agency fee to locate a new job in exactly the same trade or
business and his dominant motive for changing jobs was a nonbusiness
motive, such as a change of cliiinate. If the Cremona criterion were used
alone, the deduction would be allowed since this was an attempt to get
a new job in the same trade or business. However, because the dominant
motive for the expense was a nonbusiness purpose, the deduction would
not be allowed under Generes.
When the Tax Court ceased to use the job-securing requirement for
determining the deductibility of employment agency fees, it repudiated
a test which was both unfair to the taxpayer and illogical in relation to
section 16241 of the Internal Revenue Code. But the job-securing distinc-
tion did have one appealing advantage-it was definite and consequently
easy to apply. The same trade or business test, applied alone, is both
fair and logical in that it allows a deduction for an expense which is
related to the taxpayer's trade or business. Unfortunately, it is presently
undeveloped and offers no definite guidelines for the taxpayer. Addi-
tionally, it may be difficult to develop clear and definite guidelines due
to the difficulty in determining a subjective factor such as the dominant
motive and the room for interpretation in determining whether the new
employment is within the same trade or business. In the area of educa-
tional empense deductions, where the same trade or business criterion
has been used for years,42 the persisting uncertainty as to whether spe-
cific deductions will be allowed portends equal future uncertainty in
predicting the deductibility of employment agency fees.
WILLIAM S. PATTERSON
Landlord and Tenant-Retaliatory Eviction and the Absolute Right to
Choose Not to Have Any Tenants
When a landlord is unwilling to bring his rental units into compli-
ance with housing code provisions, does his ownership of the property
include the absolute right to discontinue rental of all such units? If so,
4 See note 2 supra.
12See note 34 supra.
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does the same absolute right exist when the landlord elects to discon-
tinue rental of some but not all of his units? The court in Robinson v.
Diamond Housing Corp.' attempted to answer these questions for the
District of Columbia.
Under common law principles, the tenant only had the right to
possession of the leased premises. 2 Thus, the landlord was under no duty
to make repairs or to keep the premises in a habitable condition.3 In
an agrarian society where the tenant rented the land primarily for the
production of crops and the buildings located thereon were merely inci-
dental,4 it may have been equitable to place the burden of repair on the
tenant. However, the plight of the low-income urban resident has forced
several jurisdictions to make a thorough reassessment of landlord-
tenant law as it is applied to the modern residential leasehold.5
Much of this judicial activism has been the result of legislative
failures. Congress attempted to remedy this situation, and, in promul-
gating a national housing policy of a "decent home" for every
American,' expressly recognized the importance of local housing codes
by conditioning monetary aid to municipalities on their adoption of such
codes.7 In order to meet the objectives of this federal policy and to
qualify for federal funds, thousands of municipalities have promulgated
housing codes and regulations.8 However, local agencies responsible for
enforcement of the codes have not been able to significantly halt or
reverse the deterioration of urban buildings.'
'No. 24,508 (D.C. Cir., Apr. 3, 1972).
1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.11 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
3For an extremely harsh application of this principle see Fowler v. Butt, 6 Mass. 63 (1809).
In addition, see Comment, Landlord and Tenant-Implied Warranty of Habitability-Demise of
the Traditional Doctrine of Caveat Emptor, 20 DE PAUL L. REV. 955,971 n.83 (1971) and citations
there listed.
'2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 106-17 (2d ed. 1923).
5For general discussion on the plight of low-income tenants see Feldman, Effective Remedies
for Tenants, 93 N.J.L.J. 481 (1970); Loeb, The Low-Income Tenant in California: A Study in
Frustration. 21 HASTINGS L.J. 287 (1970); Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A
Critical Evaluation of the Past With Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225 (1969);
Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 GEo. L.J. 519 (1966).
642 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
742 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (1970).
'For an example see D.C. Housing Regs. (1955), cited in Daniels, Judicial and Legislative
Remedies For Substandard Housing: Landlord-Tenant Law Reform In The District of Columbia,
59 GEo. L.J. 909, 913 (1971).
'The ineffectiveness of housing codes is discussed in F. GRAD, LEGAL REMEDIES FOR HOUSING
CODE VIOLATIONS 113 (1968); Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions andReme-
dies, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1254, 1255-56 (1966); Levi, Focal Leverage Points in Problems Relating
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Due to these legislative shortcomings, several jurisdictions have
adopted the view that a lease is essentially a contractual relationship
with an implied warranty of habitability and fitness.10 In order to protect
tenants who elected to exercise these new rights, a few jurisdictions have
also prohibited the landlord from terminating a tenancy where he had
a legal right to do so, but where he was motivated by a desire to retaliate
against the tenant."
The District of Columbia (especially the United States Court of
Appeals) has led the way with its innovative judicial response to the
plight of low-income tenants. In Edwards v. Habib2 it was held that a
landlord could not oust his tenant with a suit for possession in order to
punish the tenant for reporting housing code violations to governmental
authorities. This decision was followed by Brown v. Southall Realty
Co.13 where the court held that a lease purporting to convey property
burdened with substantial housing code violations was illegal and void.
Thus, under Brown, the landlord is not entitled to gain possession for
rent due under the invalid lease. Javins v. First National Realty Corp.14
further expanded the rights of tenants by holding that the warranty of
habitability was to be measured by the standards set out in the housing
regulations and incorporated by implication into all leases, whether oral
or written. Javins also conditioned the tenant's obligation to pay rent
upon the landlord's performance of his obligations, including the im-
to Real Property, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 275, 280 (1966); Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing
Codes, 78 HARV. L. REV. 801, 824 (1965).
'*For recent decisions implying the warranty of habitability see Buckner v. Azulai, 251 Cal.
App. 2d 1013, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1967); Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d II (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972);
Lund v. MacArthur, 51 Hawaii 473, 462 P.2d 482 (1969); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462
P.2d 470 (1969); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 I11. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Marini v.
Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, I11 N.W.2d 409
(1961).
"The leading case is Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1016 (1969). Other jurisdictions have recognized the defense in the following cases: McQueen v.
Druker, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971); Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt, 299 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y.
1969); Schweiger v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 476 P.2d 97, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1970); Dickhut
v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 173 N.W.2d 297 (1970). On retaliatory evictions generally see
Moskovitz, Retaliatory Evictions-The Law and the Facts, 3 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 4 (1969);
Schoshinski, supra note 5, at 541-52; Editorial Note, Retaliatory Evictions and the Reporting of
Housing Code Violations in the District of Columbia, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 190 (1967); Note,
Landlord and Tenant-Retaliatory Evictions, 3 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-Clv. LIB. L. REv. 193 (1967);
Note, Retaliatory Evictions-Is California Lagging Behind?, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 700 (1967).
12397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
13237 A.2d 834 (D.C. App. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1018 (1969).
"428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
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plied warranty to maintain the premises in a habitable condition.
Although Javins, Brown, and Edwards were all landmark cases in
landlord-tenant law, Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp.'5 may well
be the most significant of all. The events of the case began on May 2,
1968, when Mrs. Lena Robinson and her four children moved into a row
house owned by Diamond Housing. Prior to executing the month-to-
month rental agreement, Mrs. Robinson allegedly received assurance
from the landlord that major repairs would shortly be made." However,
the landlord subsequently reneged on his alleged promise, and Mrs.
Robinson began withholding rent. Suit was then instituted for posses-
sion. Mrs. Robinson successfully defended this action on grounds that
the lease was unenforceable and void due to the existence of substantial
housing code violations at the time the lease was. signed.1
7
Undaunted by this initial set-back, Diamond instituted a second
suit based on the theory that Mrs. Robinson was a trespasser since the
first action had declared the lease void. The trial court dismissed the suit
and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed. 8 The court
held that Mrs. Robinson was not a trespasser, but that "having entered
possession under a void and unenforceable lease [she] became a tenant
at sufferance."' 9 However, the Court added that the tenancy, "like any
other tenancy at sufferance, may be terminated on thirty days' notice."
2
In interpreting the housing code it was further stated:
The Housing Regulations do not compel an owner of housing
property to rent his property . . . . [I]f the landlord is unwilling or
unable to put the property in a habitable condition, he may and should
promptly terminate the tenancy and withdraw the property from the
rental market .... 2'
Diamond, relying on the above dicta, instituted a third action for
possession based on the statutory thirty-day notice to quit.22 In support
of its action, an affidavit was filed stating that Diamond was unwilling
"No. 24,508 (D.C. Cir., Apr. 3, 1972).
"Id. at 4; see id. at 5 for a listing of the housing code violations existing at the inception of
the lease.
"Id. at 5. Mrs. Robinson's defense was based on Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834
(D.C. App. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1018 (1969).
"Diamond Housing Corp. v. Robinson, 257 A.2d 492 (D.C. App. 1969).
'Id. at 495.
2Id.
21d.
"D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-902, -904 (1967).
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to make the repairs necessary to comply with the housing code and
furthermore that it intended to take the unit off the rental market. Mrs.
Robinson based her defense on the alleged retaliatory motive of the
landlord in seeking to oust her from possession of the premises. 3
The trial court granted Diamond's motion for summary judgment.
On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed, holding
that the "retaliatory defense" of Edwards v. Habib was unavailable as
a matter of law in such situations. 4
On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia was presented with the primary question: Would
the landlord be permitted to evade the Edwards prohibition of retalia-
tory evictions?" Diamond argued that to permit the defense of retalia-
tory eviction at such a protracted point may mean that it would never
be able to recover possession of its property. Equally important, Dia-
mond contended that all landlords, regardless of any limitations im-
posed by law concerning the choice of tenants, had an absolute right to
choose not to have any tenants."
In response to these contentions, the court found that the attempted
partial closing could have a "chilling effect" on the assertion of pro-
tected rights by other tenants. In brief, the court feared that such dis-
criminatory closings would intimidate the remaining tenants into non-
action .2  Accordingly, due to the "inherently destructive" effect such
closings may have, the court held that the jury should have been free to
presume that the landlord was motivated by the desire to retaliate .2
"Once [this] presumption is established, it is then up to the landlord to
rebut it by demonstrating that he is motivated by some legitimate busi-
ness purpose rather than by the illicit motive which would otherwise be
presumed. 129
23See Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
2'Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 267 A.2d 833, 835 (D.C. App. 1970).
2ln Cooks v. Fowler, 437 F.2d 669, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the same court had taken judicial
notice of the apparently rising incidents of possessory actions based on notices to quit following
closely on the heels of possessory actions based on nonpayment of rent.
26No. 24,508, at 17-18; cf. Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co., 282 F.2d 943, 950 (D.C.
Cir. 1960) (suggesting that landlord take unit off market if unwilling or unable to repair the
premises).
"No. 24,508, at 10. "There is thus a real danger that landlords may find it in their interest to
sacrifice the profits derived from operation of a few units in order to intimidate the rest of their
tenants." Id.
21Id. at 19.
2Id.; cf. NLRB v.Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 287 (1965); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S.
221, 228, 231 (1963).
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In rejecting Diamond's contention that it had an absolute right to
go out of business, the court relied on a passage from the labor law case
of Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Manufacturing Co.:30
The closing of an entire business, even though discriminatory, ends the
employer-employee relationship; the force of such a closing is entirely
spent as to that business when termination of the enterprise takes
place. On the other hand, a discriminatory partial closing may have
repercussions on what remains of the business, affording the employer
leverage for discouraging the free exercise of § 7 rights among the
remaining employees .... 31
In the Darlington case, Deering Milliken Corporation, which oper-
ated seventeen textile manufacturing plants in the South, decided to
cease operations at its Darlington, South Carolina, plant after the union
won a representation election. Following the closing of the plant, the
union filed unfair labor practice charges alleging that the closure was
based on an anti-union motivation.
The Labor Board, by a divided vote, upheld the charges against
Deering Milliken, 32 but the court of appeals refused to enforce the
Board's decision.3 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court re-
versed and held that a closing in one part of a large enterprise is an
unfair labor practice if motivated by a purpose to chill unionism in any
of the remaining plants of the single employer and if the employer
reasonably could have forseen that such closing would likely have that
effect.34
The Robinson court, in reliance on Darlington, thus drew a distinc-
tion between a landlord's absolute right to go out of business altogether
and his more limited right to discontinue part of his enterprise so as to
benefit the rest. Specifically, the court held:
While the judiciary may be powerless to control landlords who no
longer wish to remain landlords, it can prevent landlords from con-
ducting their business in a way that chills the legally protected rights
of tenants . . ..
-380 U.S. 263 (1965).
'lid. at 274-75.
3Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 241 (1962).
3Darlington Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 682 (4th Cir. 1963).
11380 U.S. at 274-75.
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* * ' Thus we hold that the landlord's right to discontinue rental
of all his units in no way justifies a partial closing designed to intimi-
date the remaining tenants. 5
It is interesting to note that the Robinson decision does not com-
pletely follow the actual holding in the Darlington case. Darlington
required proof of an illegal purpose on the part of the employer to "chill
unionism" in any of his remaining plants;" Robinson, on the other
hand, allowed a presumption that the intent of the landlord was to
coerce his remaining tenants into non-assertion of their rights." Hence
it is arguable that the Robinson court overlooked an important limiting
factor which the Darlington decision recognized: the right to go out of
business even in view of the protected rights of the employees. Because
of the collision of these disparate rights, the Darlington court refused
to base its decision on a presumption of motive. Thus it is arguable that
if the landlord's motive in Robinson was to "chill" the legally protected
rights of his remaining tenants, proof of such motive was an essential
condition precedent for the tenants' cause of action. In fact, based on
the Darlington analogy, it was mandatory.38
However, the Robinson court resolved this apparent conflict with
Darlington by drawing a further analogy to labor law. In particular, the
court employed a labor law test used to determine when the employer's
acts have constituted discrimination in violation of the National Labor
Relations Act.39
The majority of labor law cases in this area have required proof of
an "unlawful purpose" on the part of the employer." However, under
some circumstances, the employer's actions have been determined so
"inherently destructive" of important employee rights that no proof of
an anti-union motivation is needed.4 Under those circumstances, the
" No. 24,508, at 10, 23.
1380 U.S. at 274-75.
"No. 24,508, at 21.
"Cf. NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938) (employwer may hire replace-
ments during a strike in order to continue his business and is not required to discharge them
afterwards even if it means denying reinstatement to strikers).
"9See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26 (1967); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373
U.S. 221 (1963).
4See, e.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941); Edward G. Budd Mfg, Co. v.
NLRB, 138 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 778 (1944). But cf. Republic Aviation
Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
"Both the Labor Board and the United States Supreme Court have generally applied the
"inherently destructive" terminology to situations where the actions of the employer substantially
impinge upon the right of the, employees to strike. Usually, the actions of the employer operate to
[Vol. 5 1
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Labor Board can find an unfair labor practice even after the employer
has introduced evidence that his conduct was motivated by legitimate
business considerations.42
In adopting this labor law presumption of motive, the Robinson
court appears to have promulgated the following guidelines:
(1) If the tenant produces specific evidence of the landlord's
retaliatory motive, then the landlord, absent proof of any legitimate
business motive, will be prohibited from evicting the tenant.43
(2) If the landlord fails to come forward with a legitimate busi-
ness justification for the removal of the unit, then the jury may pre-
sume the landlord's actions to be retaliatory.44
(3) If the landlord's removal of the unit is both retaliatory and
is supported by a legitimate business justification, then the jury must
determine which motive was the causative factor.45
Notwithstanding this apparent resolution of the conflict with the
Darlington case, it is important to note one further discrepancy. In
particular, the labor law cases relied on for the presumption-of-motive
test were all related to employer actions taken against lawful strikers
which did not involve, as did Darlington, the decision to completely go
out of business.46 These two situations are distinguishable in that a
decision to terminate the entire business extinguishes by implication the
protected rights of the employees by precluding any remedial response
by the Labor Board. In short, the employer cannot be ordered to rein-
state the discharged employees in a business that no longer exists. On
the other hand, the cases pertaining to discrimination against lawful
strikers all involve continuing business enterprises. As a result, the rein-
statement order is a realistic remedy in such situations. Thus, it is
arguable that the Robinson court made an erroneous analogy.
Finally, after holding that the landlord could not close the rental
discriminate between strikers and non-strikers. The leading examples are NLRB v. Great Dane
Trailers, 388 U.S. 26 (1967) (employer refused to pay strikers vacation benefits accrued prior to
the strike); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963) (employer offered 20 years addi-
tional seniority both to replacements and to strikers who agreed to return to work).
"In these cases it is necessary for the Labor Board and the court to balance the significance
of the employer's interest against the impingement of such interest upon the exercise of protected
employee rights.
"3This is basically the Edwards v. Habib "retaliatory defense."
"No. 24,508, at 21.
'lid. at 23.
"See note 41 supra.
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unit and that his retaliatory motive could be presumed, the Robinson
court confronted the problem of the landlord who is unwilling, but not
unable, to repair code violations and is therefore prevented from either
evicting the tenant or collecting rent.47 Under such circumstances, it was
held that the tenant is entitled to have the premises made habitable
through a code enforcement action by the housing authorities or by a
proper suit instituted by the tenant. 48
Although the District of Columbia case law provided substantial
remedies for tenants prior to Robinson, the effectiveness of such reme-
dies was questionable due to the apparent statutory eviction procedure
left open to the landlord.49 For instance, the Javins opinion itself ap-
peared to hold out to the landlord a means of eviction based on retalia-
tion when it stated: "Our holding, of course, affects only eviction for
nonpayment of rent. The landlord is free to seek eviction at the termina-
tion of the lease or on any other legal ground."50 Thus Javins implied
that the landlord could evict that same tenant who had the month before
proven the existence of housing code violations by simply giving the
thirty-day statutory notice to quit.
Therefore the Robinson decision is important in that it closes most
of the "gaps" left by the prior decisions. The opinion is based on the
fundamental premise that "the scope and effectiveness of tenant reme-
dies for substandard housing will be determined by the degree of protec-
tion given tenants against retaliatory actions by the landlord."',
' In response to these "gaps," the Edwards v. Habib5" decision pro-
vided that the tenant may defeat an eviction based on a thirty-day notice
4 However, the court stated that [n]one of this is to say that the landlord may not go out of
business entirely if he wishes to do so or that the jury is authorized to inspect his motives if he
chooses to commit economic hara-kiri." No. 24,508, at 23.
4 This right of the tenant was recognized in Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970), where the court stated, "In extending all co tract
remedies for breach to the parties to a lease, we include an action for specific performance of the
landlord's implied warranty of habitability." Id. at 1082 n.61.
4 See, e.g., Note, D. C. Housing Regulations, Article 290, Section 2902: Construed pursuant
to Brown v. Southall Realty Co. and Javins v. First National Realty Corp.-A new day for the
urban tenant?, 16 How. L.J. 366, 374 (1971); Recent Cases, Landlord and Tenant- Warranty of
Habitability-Proof of Housing Code Violations Which Occur During the Term of a Lease Are
Admissible When Offered as a Defense to an Eviction Action for the Nonpayment of Rent, 39 U.
CIN. L. REv. 600 (1970).
0428 F.2d at 1083 n.64.
5
'Daniels, supra note 8, at 943.
52397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
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if the action of the landlord was improper. 3 However, the Edwards
decision did not go so far as to say that the landlord's decision to take
the rental unit off the market would be sufficient to raise the presump-
tion of a retaliatory motive. Therefore, Robinson now has established
such a presumption and represents a substantial victory for the tenant.
The use of labor law analogy, by the court was questionable, but it
must be recognized that Washington, D. C., "is confronted by a serious
shortage of housing . . . rentals." 54 Much of the city's good housing is
plagued by over-use and insufficient maintenance.5 In addition, a sub-
stantial percentage of the housing units in the District are substandard
or overcrowded. 6 When these factors are combined with the express
holdings of Edwards, Javins, and Brown (as well as the District of
Columbia Landlord-Tenant Regulations patterned after them),57 it ap-
pears that there was no alternative holding by which the Robinson court
could have preserved the rights of tenants.
Any other decision would have in effect permitted retaliatory evic-
tions. Such a course would have violated both the Edwards prohibition
and the District of Columbia Housing Regulations. However, in another
sense, the decision is extraordinary. The landlord may never be able to
evict the tenant so long as he is motivated by a desire to rid himself of
the tenant, even if he has a legitimate business reason for such an
eviction. More importantly, the "mere desire to take the unit off the
market is by itself [never] a legitimate business reason which will justify
an eviction."58
Thus, in the final analysis, the Robinson decision appears to raise
difficult questions regarding the supply, maintenance, and availability
of adequate low-income housing.59 Specifically, they include:
OId. at 699.
"NATIONAL CAPITAL PLANNING COMM'N, PROBLEMS OF HOUSING PEOPLE IN WASHINGTON,
D.C. 53 (1966).
5Id. at 51; see Brief for Appellee at 38-40, Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., No. 24,508
(D.C. Cir., Apr. 3, 1972).
"METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS, HOUSING GAP QUANTIFICA-
TION: A METHODOLOGY 34-35 (1968), cited in Brief for Appellee at 41 n.42, Robinson v. Diamond
Housing Corp., No. 24,508 (D.C. Cir., Apr. 3, 1972).
"D.C. Landlord-Tenant Regs. §§ 2902.1(a), (b), 2902.2, 2910 (1970), quoted in Daniels, supra
note 8, at 958, 960.
"No. 24,508, at 20.
"See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COIfM. ON URBAN HOUSING: A DECENT HOME 68-73
(1968).
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(1) Will it be impossible for landlords to absorb the cost of bringing
their units into compliance with the housing code, thus driving addi-
tional low-cost housing off the market?"
(2) If this decision does result in the decrease of low-cost housing,
then who shall develop, own, and manage such housing?
(3) If private enterprise is unable or unwilling to finance these mas-
sive repairs, should the government assume full responsibility for the
construction, maintenance, and operation of a nationwide system of
low-income housing?
It must be remembered that the only justification for this decision
is that it will serve to "increase rather than decrease the stock of habita-
ble housing in the District of Columbia."'" In thie event this result does
not follow, the justification collapses, and there is no further policy basis
for the decision.
0. MAX GARDNER III
Medical Jurisprudence-Determining the Time of Death of the Heart
Transplant Donor
Over the past twenty years medical science has made phenomenal
strides in the areas of resuscitation, life support, and organ transplanta-
tion.' With the first human heart transplant 2 the medical and legal
communities were forced to re-assess their positions on many legal and
ethical issues. Because the heart is a vital and non-paired organ, a heart
transplant necessarily results in the death of the donor. Also, it is
necessary to remove the heart from the transplant donor as soon as
possible after respiratory failure occurs. Because the heart tissue begins
to deteriorate immediately upon termination of its oxygen supply, delay
"The Robinson court concluded that this danger is largely imagined, citing only Ackerman,
Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies
and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971).
"No. 24,508, at 27-28.
'See Harvard Medical Shool Ad Hoc Committee to Examine the Definition of Brain Death,
Report: A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J.A.M.A. 337 (1968).
2The first human heart transplant was performed on Dec. 3, 1967 by Dr. Christiaan Barnard
on Louis Washkansky at Groote Schuur Hospital in Cape Town, South Africa. R. PORzio, THE
TRNSPLANT AGE 17 (1969).
3See, e.g., Timmes, The Cardiac Surgeon's Viewpoint, in THE MOMENT OF DEATH 14 (A.
Winter ed. 1969). The living donor from whom a kidney has been removed can survive on one
normal kidney.
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in removal minimizes the chance of survival in the recipient.' Since the
type of patient likely to be a potential donor is one who has suffered
irreversible and irreparable brain damage' and whose breathing is being
maintained artificially by a respirator,' the validity of the traditional
criteria for determining the time of death-cessation of heart beat and
respiration 7-has been seriously challenged. Mindful of the current state
of the arts of artificial life support and transplantation, the medical
profession has quietly adopted irreversible coma or "brain death" as an
alternative means of establishing the death of a human being.'
The heart can be removed from the "medically dead" donor while
it continues to be oxygenated by artificially maintained respiration.
However, since most state laws continue to recognize the cessation of
heart beat and respiration as the legal test for determining the time of
death, the stage is set for a direct confrontation between the medical and
the legal criteria. A strict application of the traditional criteria would
implicate as tortfeasors, or worse, surgeons who remove viable hearts
from patients whose vital functions are being maintained artificially.' In
Tucker v. Lower,10 a wrongful death action" stemming from the world's
nineteenth human heart transplant, a Virginia trial court squarely faced
the issue of what test should be used to determine the time of death. The
4Editorial, What and When Is Death?, 204 J.A.M.A. 539 (1968).
'American College of Cardiology, Bethesda Conference Report: Cardiac and Other Organ
Transplantation in the Setting of Transplant Science as a National Effort, 22 Am. J. CARDIOLOGY
896, 906 (1968).
'Shapiro, Criteria for Determining that Death Has Occurred: The Philadelphia Protocol, 16
J. FOR. MED. 1, 2-3 (1969). The author advocates turning the respirator off, declaring the patient
dead, and then turning the respirator back on to preserve the organs for transplantation.
7Haney & Salas, Problems In Anatomical Gifts, 18 J. FOR. MED. 140, 142 (1971), demon-
strate that even in the more primitive societies heartbeat and respiration are generally the criteria
used to determine death.
'Curran, Legal and Medical Death-Kansas Takes the First Step, 284 NEw ENG. J. MED.
260 (1971). The author concludes that the still-developing field of transplantation should not be
locked into strict legal requirements. See also Harvard Medical School Ad Hoc Committee to
Examine the Definition of Brain Death, supra note 1; Timmes, supra note 3.
'Letter from Loren F. Taylor, M.D., J.D., Jan. I1, 1971, in 215 J.A.M.A. 296 (1971); Note,
Gifts-The Anatomical Gifts Act of North Carolina, 6 WAKE FOREST INTRA. L. REV. 155, 161
(1969). The Deputy District Attorney for the City of Los Angeles maintains that murder is
technically committed in many transplant situations because of the uncertainty of the legal defini-
tion of death. N.Y. Times, May 8, 1968, § A, at 23, col. I.
"°No. 2831 (Ct. of Law & Eq., Richmond, Va., May 25, 1972).
"The plaintiffs also alleged malpractice and what amounted to civil conspiracy. The court
concluded that no prima facie case of malpractice had been established and the jury found for
defendants on the civil conspiracy allegation.
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trial judge resolved this volatile issue by allowing the jury to select the
death criteria from a list provided by the court-including the complete
and irreversible loss of all function of the brain. The purpose of this
note12 is to examine the medical and legal ramifications of this instruc-
tion . 3
On May 24, 1968, Bruce 0. Tucker, age 54, was brought uncon-
scious to the emergency room of the Medical College of Virginia Hospi-
tal. He had suffered a fall, sustaining severe head injuries. After cranial
surgery Tucker was placed on a respirator which kept him "mechani-
cally alive." At this time the treating physician noted that "[h]is prog-
nosis for recovery is nil and death is imminent." A neurologist was
called upon to obtain an electroencephalogram (EEG) recording to de-
termine the state of the patient's brain activity. A single EEG recording
was made which indicated no brain activity. The neurologist found no
clinical evidence of viability and no evidence of cortical activity. Based
upon this examination, he was of the opinion that the patient was then
dead from a neurological standpoint. At the same time the neurologist
also found that the decedent's heart was beating and that his body
temperature, pulse, and blood pressure were all normal for a patient in
his condition. The patient showed no evidence of being able to breathe
spontaneously. The respirator was doing all the breathing. The neurolo-
gist was of the opinion the decedent's condition was irreversible at the
time the patient was admitted to the hospital. Later in the day of May
25, in anticipation of a transplantation of Tucker's heart and kidneys,
the respirator was turned off, and the patient was pronounced dead.
IThe complex issues of euthanasia and organ donation are beyond the scope of this note and
will be dealt with only as they relate to the topic of selecting criteria for determining the time of
death.
3Instruction No. 7. The court instructs the jury that you shall determine the time
of death in this case by using the following definition of the nature of death. Death is a
cessation of life. It is the ceasing to exist. Under the law, death is not continuing but
occurs at a precise time and that time must be established according to the facts of each
specific case.
In determining the time of death, as aforesaid, under the facts and circumstances
of this case, you may consider the following elements, none of which should necessarily
be considered controlling, although you may feel under the evidence that one of [sic]
more of these conditions are controlling: the time of the total stoppage of the circulation
of the blood; the time of the total cessation of the other vital functions consequent
thereto, such as respiration and pulsation; the time of complete and irreversible loss of
all function of the brain; and, whether or not the aforesaid functions were spontaneous
or were being maintained artificially or mechanically.
Tucker v. Lower, No. 2831 (Ct. of Law & Eq., Richmond, Va., May 25, 1972).
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Until the respirator was cut off, Tucker maintained vital signs of
life-that is, he maintained, with mechanical assistance, normal body
temperature, pulse, blood pressure, and respiration. In addition to the
evidence relating to the viable state of Tucker's organs at the time he
was pronounced dead, the plaintiff presented competent evidence that
Tucker could have "lived" at least one more day with the aid of a
respirator if his heart and kidneys had not been removed." The court
concluded'5 that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case for
recovery under the Virginia Death by Wrongful Act Statutes. 6
The administrator of Tucker's estate brought a wrongful death
action against the surgeons who participated in the transplant of
Tucker's heart and kidneys. Plaintiff alleged that because certain vital
signs were normal, the donor was alive at the time the heart and kidneys
were removed. The defendants contended that because the brain of the
donor had suffered total and irreversible damage, he was medically and
legally dead several hours before the heart and kidneys were removed.
The judge, apparently influenced by the expert testimony presented by
the defendants, allowed the jury to select the criteria for determining the
time of death. The factual issues that the jury was allowed to consider
included the determination of the time of complete and irreversible loss
of all function of the brain and whether the vital functions exhibited by
the patient before the respirator was turned off were being maintained
artificially. 7 The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, apparently
accepting the time of complete loss of all function of the brain as a
criterion for determining the time of death."
The cases show that the legal criteria for determining the time of
death have remained basically unchanged over the past century. The
chief criterion for diagnosing the time of death has been the cessation
of the vital functions of respiration and circulation. 9 However, most of
"This summary of the facts of the case (Tucker v. Lower, No. 2831 Ct. of Law & Eq.,
Richmond, Va., May 25, 1972) and its final disposition were obtained from the following sources:
the allied papers (pleadings, motions, etc.) of the case; an unreported memorandum opinion written
by the trial judge, the Honorable A. Christian Compton; letters from Judge Compton to the writer,
July 25, 1972 and Sept. 13, 1972.
sTucker v. Lower, No. 2831 (Ct. of Law & Eq., Richmond, Va., May 25, 1972) (unreported
trial court opinion at 6-7).
"VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-633 to 646.1 (1972).
"See note 13 supra.
18Tucker v. Lower, No. 2831 (Ct. of Law & Eq., Richmond, Va., May 25, 1972) (judgment
filed by the court).
"E.g., In re Estate of Schmidt, 261 Cal. App. 2d 262, - , 67 Cal. Rptr. 847, 854 (1968).
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the cases in which the question has arisen have involved the issue of
survivorship for purposes of inheritance, termination of joint tenancies,
or determination of rights in the proceeds of insurance policies. Appar-
ently, no court has ever applied a test for determining the time of death
where the issue was the tort liability of a physician."0 In the property-
rights cases, the courts have looked to the medical profession for a
"definition of death." In support of their application of the traditional
criterion of the cessation of heart beat and respiration, the courts have
relied on Black's Law Dictionary,"' on expert medical testimony,2 and
on judicial notice of prevailing medical practice.2z The criterion is
sometimes restated as "the cessation of all vital functions,' 2 4 and occa-
sional refinements, such as the accompanying permanent cessation of
the action of the central nervous system, are sometimes added;25 but,
basically, the traditional criteria have remained unaltered.
In Smith v. Smith8 the first attempt to induce a court to recognize
the brain death test was made. There husband and wife received fatal
injuries in the same accident, but the wife, who was in a coma due to
brain injury, lived seventeen days longer than the husband. The court
refused to agree that both husband and wife had died at the same time:
"We take judicial notice that one breathing, though unconscious, is not
dead." In a similar California case, In re Estate of Schmidt,20 the trial
court's memorandum opinion stated that, in the opinion of the medical
2OSee, e.g., I M. HouTs, COURTROOM MEDICINE: DEATH § 1.03(2), at 31-32 (1971). The
author notes critically the scarcity of judicial attempts, other than in property cases, to define
death. See also Wasmuth, The Concept of Death, 30 OHIO ST. L.J. 32 (1969).21Smith v. Smith, 229 Ark. 579, 586, 317 S.W.2d 275, 279 (1958); In re Estate of Schmidt,
261 Cal. App. 2d 262, _ 67 Cal. Rptr. 847, 854 (1968); Thomas v. Anderson, 96 Cal. App. 2d
371, ____ 215 P.2d 478, 481-82 (1950); Schmitt v. Pierce, 344 S.W.2d 120, 133 (Mo. 1961). These
cases applied the following definition of death from BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 488 (rev. 4th ed.
1968): "The cessation of life; the ceasing to exist; defined by physicians as a total stoppage of
circulation of the blood, and a cessation of the animal and vital functions consequent thereon,
such as respiration, pulsation, etc."
22Gray v. Sawyer, 247 S.W.2d 496, 497 (Ky. 1952).
2Vaegemast v. Hess, 203 Minn. 207, 210, 280 N.W. 641, 643 (1938).
21Telefilm, Inc. v. Superior Court, 194 P.2d 542, 547 (Cal. App. 1948), rev'd on other grounds,
33 Cal. 2d 289, 201 P.2d 811 (1949); see United Trust Co. v. Pyke, 199 Kan. 1, 4, 427 P.2d 67, 71
(1967).
2'Gugel's Adm'r v. Orth's Ex'r, 314 Ky. 591, 594, 236 S.W.2d 460,461-62 (1950) (based upon
expert medical testimony); In re Stuertz' Estate, 124 Neb. 149, 153, 245 N.W. 412, 414 (1932).
2'229 Ark. 579, 317 S.W.2d 275 (1958).
Rld. at 589, 317 S.W.2d at 281.
'1261 Cal. App. 2d 262, 67 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1968).
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experts, death might be the inability to be resuscitated or an irreversible
coma. The trial court ignored this evidence however, and used the tradi-
tional criterion as outlined in Black's Law Dictionary-cessation of
heart beat and respiration. Appellants argued that the traditional defini-
tion was anachronistic in view of the recent medical developments relat-
ing to heart transplants, and that the trial court should have accepted
the inability to be resuscitated as the definition of death. The appellate
court affirmed the definition used by the trial court and stated that the
definition offered by the medical experts, though interesting, would not
dispose of the survivorship issue at bar because there was no evidence
as to the resuscitability of both spouses."9 Thus, a survey of the existing
case law demonstrates that most courts apply the traditional medical
criterion"° and that one court would possibly be willing to apply non-
traditional criteria (established by expert medical testimony) if the op-
portunity were properly presented.
In 1970 Kansas codified a "definition of death"'" in an attempt
to achieve the related goals of obtaining viable organs for transplanta-
tion and of protecting transplant surgeons from civil and criminal liabil-
ity.32 The statute permits use of an alternative definition of death. A
2 1d. at , 67 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
"'See, e.g., Comment, Legal Aspects of Euthanasia, 36 ALBANY L. REV. 674, 688 (1972).
"The text of KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (Supp. 1971) providing alternative definitions of
death is as follows:
Definition of death. A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in
the opinion of a physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice, there is the
absence of spontaneous respiratory and cardiac function and, because of the disease or
condition which caused, directly or indirectly, these functions to cease, or because of the
passage of time since these functions ceased, attempts at resuscitation are considered
hopeless; and, in this event, death will have occurred at the time these functions ceased;
or
A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in the opinion of a
physician based on ordinary standards of medical practice, there is the absence of
spontaneous brain function; and if based on ordinary standards of medical practice,
during reasonable attempts to either maintain or restore spontaneous circulatory or
respiratory function in the absence of aforesaid brain function, it appears that further
attempts at resuscitation or supportive maintenance will not succeed, death will have
occurred at the time when these conditions first coincide. Death is to be pronounced
before artificial means of supporting respiratory and circulatory function are terminated
and before any vital organ is removed for purposes of transplantation.
These alternative definitions of death are to be utilized for all purposes in this state,
including the trials of civil and criminal cases, any laws to the contrary notwithstanding.
""Letter from Taylor, supra note 9. Dr. Taylor is a physician and lawyer who assisted in
drafting the Kansas statute.
1972]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
subject is legally dead when either of the following conditions exist:
respiration and cardiac function have ceased or spontaneous brain func-
tion is absent. Apparently, the means for determining whether either of
these events has occurred are to be left to the standards of the medical
profession. There are some in the medical and legal professions who do
not support a legislative statement of the criteria to be used in determin-
ing the time of death, and a debate has arisen over the need for legisla-
tion such as that enacted in Kansas.3 Those opposed to the statute
fear that the law will stultify medical advances as more becomes known
about transplantation and life-support mechanics. They would prefer to
rely on the courts to determine the issue as one of fact on a case-by-
case basis based on expert medical evidence.3 4 Opposed to such a view
are those who desire legislative protection for those doctors performing
transplants, especially heart transplants, on patients with irreversible
brain damage. 5 Although no cases have yet appeared interpreting the
statute, it appears that the wording is flexible enough to accommodate
the objectives of both camps. The statute provides an alternate "defini-
tion of death" in allowing the "absence of spontaneous brain func-
tion' '16 to be an indicator of death, but it does not make rigid the means
by which the absence of spontaneous brain function is to be determined.
The courts are required by the statute to rely upon "ordinary standards
of medical practice" 7 in evaluating medical opinion as to the time of
death and the criteria used in making the time-of-death determination.
Since the Kansas statute is the first legislative definition of death, its
passage is not necessarily indicative of a general acceptance by the law
of non-traditional death criteria.
"See, e.g., Curran, supra note 8; Kennedy, The Kansas Statute on Death-An Appraisal,
285 NEw ENG. J. MED. 946 (1971) (criticizing the Kansas death statute on the grounds that it will
hamper medical science); Mills, The Kansas Death Statute: Bold and Innovative, 285 Naw ENo.
J. MED. 968 (1971) (concluding that the Kansas statute will protect transplant physicians legally
while allowing flexibility in death determination).
31See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 33. In Note, Human Organ Transplantation: Some Medico.
Legal Pitfalls For Transplant Surgeons, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 134, 136 n.15 (1970) the following
observation is made: "Many physicians have shown a resistance to pressing for a change in the
legal definition of death, feeling that a legal enactment would necessarily be rigid and restrictive.
There is sentiment that the danger of effective prosecution is remote because expert testimony not
supporting the brain death criteria would be impossible to obtain."
"See. e.g., Note, 23 U. FLA. L. REV., supra note 34, at 156 (suggesting that society should
assume through legislation some of the risk now being borne by transplant physicians).
a'KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (Supp. 1971).
DId.
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Another statutory enactment closely related to the 1970 Kansas
statute is the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA), s adopted by
more than forty states and the District of Columbia.3 9 The UAGA is
an attempt to legislate a more efficient means of obtaining organs for
the purpose of transplantation." The importance of the Act to the de-
bate over what criterion should be used in determining the time of death
lies not in what it says but in what it fails to say. The UAGA specifically
omits a definition of death. The Commissioners decided that this was
primarily a medical question currently in a state of flux rather than an
issue for legal codification. 41 The Act provides simply that "[t]he time
of death shall be determined by a physician who attends the donor at
his death, or, if none, the physician who certifies the death. '42 The
Kansas statute was adopted in part to complement the UAGA as en-
acted in Kansas by providing the definition of death that was purposely
omitted from the UAGA.43 The case law interpreting the provisions of
the UAGA relating to the determination of the time of death is non-
existent. The commentators are split along the same lines that formed
when Kansas passed its statute providing for alternative "definitions of
death." Those who believe that the courts should and will accept what
the medical profession declares to be the criterion for determining the
time of death oppose any legislation on the matter and support the
omission in the UAGA . 4 Those desiring the security of a stated legal
guideline advocate modification of the UAGA to provide for procedures
M'UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, as proposed by the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws on July 30, 1968; e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-220.1 to -220.11 (Supp. 1971).
"'Dukeminier, Supplying Organs for Transplantation, 68 MICH. L. REV. 811, 817 (1970).
"The UAGA provides for designation by the donor before his death of the use to which his
organs are to be put. If the deceased gave no consent prior to his death for the removal of his
organs the Act lists the priority by which the next of kin can give consent after the death of the
donor. UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT AT § 2(b).
1UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 7, Comment; see Smith & Smith, Kansas and the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 19 U. KAN. L. REV. 569, 574 (1971).
4 UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 7(b); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-220.7(b) (Supp. 1971).
43Letter from Taylor, supra note 9.
"See, e.g., American College of Cardiology, supra note 5, at 908 (stating that the subject was
correctly treated in the UAGA); Sommer, Additional Thoughts On the Legal Problems of Heart
Transplants, 41 N.Y. ST. B.J. 196, 199 (1969) (definition of death must ultimately be determined
by physicians); cf. Comment, Suggested Revisions to Clarify the Uncertain Impact of Section 7
of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act on Determination of Death, 11 ARIz. L. REV. 749 (1969)
(predicting that the courts will allow the medical profession to use any reasonable standard in
determining death).
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for determining the time of death. 5
An important issue common to both the debate over the need for
the Kansas statute and the debate over the wisdom of omitting a defini-
tion of death from the UAGA is whether courts consider the standard
for determining the time of death to be an issue of law or fact." There
are actually two standards the courts must consider: first, the criterion
for determining if death has occurred, that is, the stage in the decline
of life at which the medical profession declares or is allowed to declare
a person dead, and, second, the clinical tests to be used in determining
if the death criterion has been met.47 In determining the first standard,
several questions are presented. First, a decision must be reached
whether to recognize, in certain circumstances, criteria other than the
traditional cessation of heart beat and respiration. If the traditional
criteria are outmoded, as most of the medical profession claims," is
'
5 Wecht & Aranson, Medical-Legal Ramifications of Human Tissue Transplantation, 18
DEPAUL L. REV. 488 (1969); Comment, Medico-Legal Problems with the Question of Death, 5
CALIF. W.L. REV. 110, 122 (1968); Note, 6 WAKE FOREST INTRA. L. REV., supra note 9, at 155.
"The Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School, which set forth clinical criteria to
be used in diagnosing irreversible coma in 1968, assumed that the issue would be determined by
expert medical testimony and took a stance opposed to legislation in the area, as follows:
In this report, however, we suggest that responsible medical opinion is ready to
adopt new criteria for pronouncing death to have occurred in an individual sustaining
irreversible coma as a result of permanent brain damage. If this position is adopted by
the medical community, it can form the basis for change in the current legal concept of
death. No statutory change in the law should be necessary since the law treats this
question essentially as one of fact to be determined by physicians.
Harvard Medical School Ad Hoc Committee to Examine the Definition of Brain Death, supra
note 1, at 339.
47Heretofore, as seen in the cases discussed in the text accompanying notes 19-25 supra, courts
apparently have relied upon the medical profession for these criteria. Now that there has been a
defacto adoption by the members of the medical profession of the brain death definition it remains
to be seen whether the courts will continue to rely upon expert medical testimony in establishing a
new death standard.
"S"The death of a person occurs when the brain is totally and irreversibly damaged and
nonfunctioning; many other tissues may still be viable and functioning." American College of
Cardiology, supra note 5, at 908. Beecher, After the "Definition of Irreversible Coma," 281 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 1070 (1969), alleges that the definition of irreversible coma as set down in the
Harvard Report of 1968 has been widely accepted. Corday, Life-Death in Human Transplantation,
55 A.B.A.J. 629, 631 (1969), reveals that many physicians have based their criteria for diagnosis
of cerebral death on lesser considerations than suggested by the Harvard Report and have trans-
planted hearts of those still having spontaneous respiration. See also Harvard Medical School Ad
Hoc Committee to Examine the Definition of Brain Death, supra note 1; Task Force on Death
and Dying of the Institute of Society, Ethics, and the Life Sciences, Refinements in Criteria for
the Determination of Death: An Appraisal, 221 J.A.M.A. 48 (1972) (approving of the death criteria
established by the Harvard Report of 1968); Comment, 5 CALIF. W.L. REv., supra note 45, at
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"brain death" or irreversible coma to be the stage in a patient's decline
at which he may be declared dead even though he exhibits normal
(though mechanically maintained) respiration and heart beat? Kansas
has responded in the affirmative to this initial question.49 Second, if a
change is to be made in the legally recognized death criteria, should the
change be by legislative enactment or should the courts make the change
by relying upon expert medical testimony? And if the decision is made
to allow the courts to make the change in criteria by relying upon
medical testimony, should the court acknowledge the medical realities
as a matter of law or as a matter of fact-that is, should the judge
instruct the jury as to what is the standard for death-determination, or
should the jury be allowed, as in Tucker, to decide as a matter of fact
in each case what the recognized standard is to be?
However the change is effected, a decision must be made regarding
the clinical means used to determine if the acknowledged point at which
death legally occurs has been reached. If, as in Kansas, absence of
spontaneous brain function is adopted by statute as the point at which
death can be legally declared, what clinical indicators of this state are
to be recognized? What clinical indicators are sufficiently reliable to
make it legally permissible for a surgeon to declare an artificially respir-
ated person dead? Some committees of the medical profession have
proposed certain criteria based upon simple clinical observations. 0
Other members of the profession would place principal reliance on the
absence of electrical brain activity as recorded by an electroence-
phalogram.5t It is obvious that acceptable means must be developed to
insure against premature transplants. Are these clinical criteria to be
121 (present medical definition of death alleged to entail the irreversible loss of neural function);
Note, 23 U. FLA. L. REV., supra note 34, at 137-38.
"KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (Supp. 1971); see note 31 supra for the full text of the statute.
50For example, the following is a brief sketch of the criteria set forth in the Report of the
Harvard Medical School Ad Hoc Committee to Examine the Definition of Brain Death, supra
note 1: (1) unreceptivity and unresponsivity to externally applied stimuli and inner need; (2) no
spontaneous muscular movements or spontaneous respiration; (3) no elicitable brain reflexes; and
(4) flat electroencephalogram. In addition, the report suggests that the above findings again be
verified on a repeat testing at least 24 hours later, and that the existence of hypothermia and central
nervous system depressants be excluded. It is also recommended that if the criteria are fulfilled
the patient be declared dead before the respirator is disconnected.
5'Hamlin, Life or Death by EEG, 190 J.A.M.A. 112-14 (1964). Recently, however, it has been
concluded that a majority of neurologists have rejected the proposition that EEG determinations
are sufficient as the sole basis for a determination of death. Task Force on Death and Dying of
the Institute of Society, Ethics, and the Life Sciences, supra note 48, at 53.
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required by statute? The Kansas statute makes no reference to the
means by which the attending physician is to determine if there is an
absence of spontaneous brain function.5 2 Is the judge to instruct the jury
on the basis of expert medical testimony, or should the jury be allowed
to choose among the clinical means presented?
It would seem to be imperative, because of the legal and social
consequences, that the time of death be ascertainable by the application
of absolute and unchanging criteria.53 Thus, it should not be within the
province of the jury to determine at what stage one ceases to live. Nor
should it be within the jury's power to select the technical indicators to
be employed in determining if that stage was reached. These decisions
are of such great social importance that they should not be left to the
vagaries of jury deliberations. The multitude of problems that would
arise if the jury were permitted to select the criteria for determining the
time of death is obvious.-4
One of the significant aspects of Tucker is that the judge considered
the issue of what criteria were to be used in determining the time of
death to be one of fact to be decided by the jury. In the instruction
dealing with the time of death,5 the jury was allowed to choose the
applicable criteria from several elements provided by the court (from
expert medical testimony presented). The major choice presented to the
jury was between the traditional criterion on the one hand-the cessa-
tion of heart beat and respiration-and the complete and irreversible
loss of all brain function on the other. This is the first case in which an
American trial judge has allowed the jury to consider loss of brain
function as a criterion for determining the time of death. However, even
though the jury was not instructed to consider the medical testimony
controlling," the jury did adopt the brain death standard presented by
expert medical testimony, and the practice of relying upon the medical
profession for the standard of death was thus continued.
2KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (Supp. 1971).
53Halley & Harvey, Medical vs. Legal Definitions of Death, 204 J.A.M.A. 423, 425 (1968),
suggest that conflicts between the medical and legal definitions of death should be resolved through
an interprofessional co-operative effort.
*'The kind of problems that would result is exemplified by the possibility of having one jury
declare a heart donor alive at the time of the transplantation while another jury found the same
donor was dead when his heart was removed.
"Note 13 supra.
56Id.
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There was no instruction to the jury as to the clinical means to be
employed in determining whether the death standard, as selected by the
jury, had been met.57 Thus the court also allowed the jury to determine,
as an issue of fact, whether the clinical tests employed by the defendants
in reaching their diagnosis of brain death were sufficient to safeguard
against premature transplantation. Physicians performing transplanta-
tions on patients still exhibiting mechanically maintained vital signs
(heart beat and respiration) are less likely to be subject to malpractice
and wrongful death liability if the medical profession's death standard
is followed by the juries. The judge's instructions and the jury verdict
reached thereon are consistent with the provisions of the UAGA, which
leaves the determination of the time of death to the attending or certify-
ing physician. Total reliance is placed upon the judgment of the physi-
cian. The death-criteria instruction given in Tucker is very similar in
substance to the Kansas statute which allows "alternative definitions of
death." Both allow the "brain death criteria" to be used if supporting
medical evidence has been given. Also, both make no mention of the
clinical tests to be applied in verifying the diagnosis of "brain death."
One major difference is that the Kansas statute makes the death criteria
a matter of law whereas in Tucker it was a matter of fact. Another
difference is that the Kansas statute requires a person to be declared
dead if either of the legal standards are met, whereas in Tucker the jury
was given much greater discretion in its determination of death. Thus
Tucker has broken the precedent established by the cases relying upon
Black's Law Dictionary for death-determining criteria and has nar-
rowed the gap between medical reality and legal cognizance in the area
of transplant surgery.
CONCLUSIONS
Two general conclusions may be drawn concerning the effect of
Tucker on previous law. First, the case re-emphasizes the role of the
medical profession in the determination of death. Through the jury's
acceptance of the expert medical testimony, the medical profession was
allowed to dictate, as a matter of fact, when death occurs and by what
clinical tests this determination is to be made. Although the law has
little expertise in the field of clinical diagnostics, as the guardian of
1972]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
social welfare it does have expertise in the field of social policy. That
is, the criteria for determining the time of death should not be a factual
issue to be decided by the jury in each case but, instead, should be a
socially accepted statement of the law, duly responding to medical ad-
vancements but not completely controlled by a purported consensus of
medical science.58
Second, by recognizing brain death as a possible means for deter-
mining the time of death, the Tucker case, like the Kansas statute,
acknowledges medical realities. Since the appearance of the Harvard
Report,5' which stated the "brain death" criteria in 1968, there has been
general acceptance by the medical profession that one is dead when his
brain is not functioning and his respiration is not spontaneous." Again,
the medical need for transplant organs and the social need for protecting
potential donors from premature transplantation are not issues to be
resolved by exclusive reliance upon the medical profession.
While the medical profession would doubtless approve of the ver-
dict reached in Tucker, the death criteria and the clinical tests applied
to indicate the satisfaction of these criteria are questions too socially
important to be considered factual issues to be decided by a jury. Since
there is no legal precedent for the courts to follow in establishing death
criteria to be employed in the transplant context, the various legislatures
of the states should recognize the dilemma with which the courts and
physicians are faced and should return to the pronouncement of death
the much needed characteristic of finality.
RICHMOND STANFIELD FREDERICK II
Separation of Powers-The Suspended Sentence
Every day more than one hundred and fifty Americans are killed
in automobile accidents.' Over half of these fatalities involve alcohol-
uThere are other problems with which law-makers will have to grapple in this complex area
of transplantation. Who is to decide how the limited number of available organs is to be distributed
for transplantation? Are physicians to be given absolute freedom to determine who is to live and
who is to die? When human resources are to be allocated, who is to exercise the ultimate control?
Unfortunately, discussion of these issues is beyond the limitations of this note.
5 Harvard Medical School Ad Hoc Committee to Examine the Definition of Brain Death,
supra note I.
"See authorities cited note 48, supra.
'McDowell, How Phoenix Gets Drunks Off the Road, READER'S DIGEST, Feb. 1972, at 52.
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related accidents.2 Outraged by this senseless carnage, various state
legislaturesl and governmental agencies have commenced an all-out
campaign against driving under the influence of alcohol. In Wisconsin,
the arresting officer uses a mobile videotape camera to record the vehi-
cle's abnormal operation and the driver's behavior.' Vermont has a
tough program of interrogation and coordination tests given to special
enforcement officers while measured amounts of alcohol gradually
bring their blood alcohol level up to the state's intoxication standard.4
In Nassau County, New York, a twenty-four hour telephone service is
maintained so drunks can call for transportation.' The Idaho state legis-
lature has cracked down by setting a mandatory ten-day sentence on all
drivers convicted of driving under the influence.' The statute provided
that the sentence shall be imposed by every judge in Idaho without any
right to exercise judicial discretion.
Found guilty of driving under the influence by an Idaho probate
court, Ernesto Medina was fined one hundred and seventy-five dollars
and sentenced to thirty days in the county jail.7 The judge then sus-
pended the entire jail sentence and most of the fine, placing Medina on
probation for six months. The prosecutor promptly filed a writ of man-
date to compel the judge either to sentence the defendant according to
the mandatory ten-day provision or to show cause why. The district
court quashed the writ, and on appeal the Idaho Supreme Court held
that the mandatory provision of the statute was an unconstitutional
breach of the separation of powers and an invalid limitation upon the
Another 9,560 are injured daily. Id. These figures are, of course, averages.
21d. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration estimates that a driver with 0.10%
blood-alcohol concentration is almost seven times more likely to have a vehicle collision than his
non-drinking counterpart. Once the blood-alcohol concentration reaches 0.15% the driver is 25
times more likely to have a collision than a non-drinker. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, THE ALCOHOL SAFETY COUNTERMEASURES
PROGRAM 3-4 (rev. ed. 1971).
3TimE, Apr. 3, 1972, at 59. As of April 1972, every driver videotaped and charged has pleaded
guilty to operating while intoxicated. Most of these drivers have been placed on a corrective
probationary program. Id.
'TIME, Mar. 6, 1972, at 55.
5McDowell, supra note 1, at 54.
'IDAHO CODE § 49-1102(d) (Supp. 1971): "Every person convicted under this section shall
serve at least ten (10) days in the county or municipal jail and this sentence shall be mandatory on
every judge of every court of the state of Idaho without any right to exercise judicial discretion in
said matter .. "
7State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, -, 486 P.2d 247, 248 (1971).
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court's inherent right to suspend sentences.8 The court rested its decision
upon the common law power to suspend sentences, the tripartite separa-
tion of powers of the Idaho constitution, the inherent powers of the
judiciary, and a common-sense interpretation of the role of the judge in
our system of law?
At common law the severity of sentences, the inability to decree
new trials, and the lack of an effective appellate review of the facts gave
rise to the court's power to suspend sentence, at least temporarily, even
in the absence of an enabling statute.'0 In Sir Matthew Hale's Pleas of
the Crown, a scholarly work on the criminal law by the chief justice of
the Court of the King's Bench in the seventeenth century, the author
noted three kinds of suspension:
Reprieves or stays of judgment or execution are of three kinds.
viz.
I. Ex mandato regis [from the King's order], .. by some mes-
sage, or by sending his ring, but at this day it is ordinarily signified by
the privy signet, or by the master of requests.
II. Ex arbitrio judicis [from the authority of the judge]. Some-
times the judge reprieves before judgment, as where he is not satisfied
with the verdict, or the evidence is uncertain, or the indictment insuffi-
cient, or doubtful whether within clergy; and sometimes after judg-
ment, if it be a small felony, tho out of clergy, or in order to a pardon
or transportation ...
III. Ex necessitate legis [from the law of necessity], which is in
case of pregnancy, where a woman is convict of felony or treason."
However, a later commentator, the famous Sir William Black-
stone, stressed the temporary nature of suspension:
I. A reprieve, from reprendre, to take back, is the withdrawing
of a sentence for an interval of time: whereby the execution is sus-
pended. This may be, first, ex arbitrio judicis; either before or after
judgment: as, where the judge is not satisfied with the verdict, or the
81d. at _ 486 P.2d at 252. The power to suspend sentences refers to two distinct procedures:
suspension by refusing to impose and pronounce sentence once guilt has attached or the suspension
of the execution of a sentence already pronounced. The Idaho court was dealing with the latter
interpretation of suspended sentence. Unless otherwise indicated, this note is concerned with sus-
pension of the execution of sentence.
'Id. at ._ 486 P.2d at 249-52.
"People ex rel. Forsyth v. Court of Sessions, 141 N.Y. 288, 292-93, 36 N.E. 386, 387 (1894).
See also 30 HARV. L. REv. 369 (1917).
"12 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 412-13 (S. Emlyn ed. 1778).
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evidence is suspicious, or the indictment is insufficient, or he is doubt-
ful whether the offence be within clergy; or sometimes if it be a small
felony, or any favorable circumstances appear in the criminal's charac-
ter, in order to give room to apply to the crown for either an absolute
or conditional pardon. 2
Relying mainly on Blackstone's qualification of the temporary na-
ture of suspended sentences, in 1916 the United States Supreme Court
held in Ex parte United States3 that the federal district courts did not
have the power to suspend sentences. The majority of state courts now
hold that in the absence of statute a court may withhold temporarily the
imposition of sentence for a term, but the court is powerless to suspend
permanently the operation of a sentence already imposed. 4 The courts
of a handful of states, including New York," New Jersey, 6 North Caro-
14 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *394. Blackstone also recognized the pregnancy, insanity,
and non-identity pleas for temporary suspension or stay of execution as well as the permanent
King's pardon. Id. at *396.
'242 U.S. 27 (1916). In 1925 Congress passed a federal probation act the present version of
which provides in part as follows:
Upon entering a judgment of conviction of any offense not punishable by death or
life imprisonment, any court having jurisdiction to try offenses against the United States
when satisfied that the ends of justice and the best interest of the public as well as the
defendant will be served thereby, may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence
and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and condi-
tions as the court deems best.
18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1970).
"ALI-ABA JOINT COmm. ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., THE PROBLEM OF SENTENCING 40
(1962). See also J. WAITE, THE PREVENTION OF REPEATED CRIME 95 (1943).
"People ex rel. Forsyth v. Court of Sessions, 141 N.Y. 288, 292, 36 N.E. 386, 387 (1894):
"There can, I think, be no doubt that the power to suspend sentence after conviction was inherent
in all such courts at common law." Therefore, the New York Court of Appeals concluded that
the court of sessions, a court with superior criminal jurisdiction, had the power to suspend the
imposition of sentence. In People v.Oskroba, 305 N.Y. 113, 117, 111 N.E.2d 235, 236-37 (1953),
the court of appeals stated, "It has long been accepted practice in the administration of criminal
law that, after conviction, a court may suspend the sentence or execution of judgment and place
the defendant on probation, a power inherent in the court at common law ... "
However, some New York cases restrict this power to suspend as applying only to crimes set
out in the penal code, and in a case involving the sale of spirituous liquors, a violation of the Liquor
Tax Law and not the Penal Code, the New York Supreme Court held that a lower court judge
could not suspend the execution of a sentence where the specific statute required that one convicted
be imprisoned. People ex rel. Hirschberg v. Seeger, 179 App. Div. 792, 166 N.Y.S. 913 (1917).
'""Enough, however, can be gathered from the English precedents to show that courts of
criminal jurisdiction exercised the power of delaying the imposition of a sentence for variou
reasons, and of delaying the operation of an imposed sentence, and did not do this by virtue of
any statute, and therefore must have inherently had the power so to do." State ex rel. Gehrmann
v. Osborne, 79 N.J. Eq. 430, 441, 82 A. 424, 428 (Ch. 1911). The court held that, if the defendant
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lina, 7 Michigan,"5 Ohio 9 and now Idaho, 20 regard the power to suspend
as inherent in the judiciary, although only in the Idaho case was a court
faced with overruling a specific legislative mandate in the criminal stat-
ute itself prohibiting the suspension of sentence. Nevertheless, today
virtually all states empower their courts to suspend the execution or the
imposition of sentence in conjunction with a probation system.,
Conceding that the power might have existed at common law, the
state prosecutor in the Idaho case argued that the state legislature
clearly has the power to abrogate the common law.2 The state is not
inexorably bound by common law principles. The Idaho Supreme Court
readily agreed but pointed out that this power is not merely a substan-
tive element of the common law; rather, it goes to the very nature of
the judiciary branch of the state government.23
According to the Idaho state constitution, the judicial power is
vested in the courts;2 4 however, state constitutions have traditionally
been regarded as limitations upon power, not grants of power .2  Like
most state constitutions, the specific powers of the judiciary are not
does not object, it can suspend the imposition of sentence. Id. at 443, 82 A. at 429. Concerning
the power to suspend the execution of a sentence once pronounced, see Clifford v. Heller, 63 N.J.L.
105, 116, 42 A. 155, 159 (1899): "At common law reprieve might be granted either by the king
under his power to pardon or by the court, and every court which had power to award execution
had power to grant a reprieve. This reprieve was simply a suspension of the sentence."
"
7State v. Simmington, 235 N.C. 612, 614, 70 S.E.2d 842, 844 (1952): "A court has the
inherent power to suspend a judgment or stay execution of a sentence in a criminal case."
"
8 People v. Stickle, 156 Mich. 557, 564, 121 N.W. 497, 499 (1909): "Assuming the power to
be, as it was at common law asserted to be, a power inherent in courts, no new power is conferred
upon courts when the legislature in terms authorizes courts to suspend sentence."
"An early Ohio case recognized the inherent power of the court to suspend sentence, but
apparently in Ohio the.power could be abrogated by the state legislature. Weber v. State, 58 Ohio
St. 616, 619, 51 N.E. 116, 117 (1898): "The power to stay the execution of a sentence, in whole or
in part, in a criminal case, is inherent in every court having final jurisdiction in such cases, unless
otherwise provided by statute."
194 Idaho at _ 486 P.2d at 251: "In this light, we perceive that the authority possessed
by the courts to sentence necessarily includes the power to suspend the whole or any part of that
sentence in proper cases and this is more than a bare rule of substantive law subject to change by
the legislature. Rather, it is in the nature of an inherent right of the judicial department. .. "
2 Professor John Waite has listed statutory programs of probation and suspended sentence for
forty-five states, the District of Columbia, and the federal system. J. WAITE, supra note 14 at 96-
105.
294 Idaho at _ 486 P.2d at 249.
DId. at _ , 486 P.2d at 251.211DAHO CONST. art. 5, § 2.
'See, e.g., Los Angeles Met. Transp. Auth. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 59 Cal. 2d 863, 868, 382
P.2d 583, 585, 31 Cal. Rptr. 463, 465 (1963); Mclntyre v. Clarkson, 254 N.C. 510, 515, 119 S.E,2d
888, 891 (1961); Shepherd v. San Jacinto Junior College Dist., 363 S.W.2d 742, 743 (Tex. 1962).
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enumerated in the Idaho Constitution; however, article V, section thir-
teen provides that the legislature has no power "to deprive the judicial
department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it as
a coordinate department of the government."2 Although the concept of
vested judicial power is difficult to define, many aspects of this inherent
power have been recognized by state and federal courts in the evolution
of case law. The contempt power,27 the power of the attorney general
to enter nolle prosequi on an indictment,2 and the power to run sent-
ences concurrently 2 have all been recognized as not requiring any ena-
bling legislation. These powers, as well as the power to suspend sent-
ences, are illustrative of the vested judicial power as interpreted by
different courts without being all-inclusive.
If courts do have the inherent power to suspend sentence, serious
questions concerning the separation of powers arise. States that deny the
power to suspend sentence in the absence of statute often reason that
this is judicial infringement upon the executive's power to pardon."
However, in practice the courts usually suspend sentence only for minor
offenses, reserving more serious crimes for the governor's pardon.',
Also, the trial judge who observed all the evidence, the witnesses' de-
meanor, and testimony regarding the defendant's character will be in a
better position to decide upon the appropriate punishment, imprison-
ment or probation. Arguably, the executive power to pardon affects the
2 IDAHO CONST. art. 5, § 13. For a very similar provision see N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
"In State v. Steelworkers Local 5760, 172 Ohio St. 75, 80, 173 N.E.2d 331, 336 (1961), the
Supreme Court of Ohio declared the general rule: "That a court inherently, and quite apart from
any statutory authority or express constitutional grant, possesses such contempt power has been
the rule from time immemorial."
2The inherent common law powers of the attorney general in regard to nolle prosequi are
extensively set out in People ex rel. Elliott v. Covelli, 415 Il1. 79, 83-89, 112 N.E.2d 156, 158-61
(1953). The general rule is that in the absence of statute, the power to enter a nolle prosequi is
vested in the attorney general or in the several public prosecutors. 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 457
(1961).
a"In the absence of statute, the determination whether two sentences to the same penal
institution shall run concurrently or consecutively is an incident to the judicial function of imposing
sentences upon a convict and is a matter for the determination of the court." Redway v. Walker,
132 Conn. 300, 306, 43 A.2d 748, 751 (1945). See also 24B C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1994 (1962).
3OSee, e.g., State v. Sturgis, 110 Me. 96, 101, 85 A. 474, 477 (1912); Rightnour v. Gladden,
219 Ore. 342, 355, 347 P.2d 103, 110 (1959). Apparently, the many states that require legislation
before the courts can suspend sentence reason that when two branches of government, the legisla-
ture and the judiciary, combine to infringe the executive's power to pardon the infringement is more
palatable.
112 N.C.L. REv. 50, 52 (1923).
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punishment and perhaps even the defendant's guilt.3" Under a sus-
pended sentence with the condition of defendant's good behavior, the
conviction and the civil disabilities remain;33 eventually, the defendant
may have to suffer the punishment.
Perhaps the greatest friction in the separation of powers arises
between the judicial and legislative branches. The particular role of the
legislative body in regard to the criminal law is to list and delineate the
offenses forbidden and to set the maximum and minimum penalties.34
Thus, these elected representatives seek to embody the will of the people
by setting penalties which expressly gauge the degree of society's disap-
proval of the proscribed conduct. 3 Certainly, the aims of the Idaho
legislature were meritorious in seeking to deter intoxicated drivers by
imposing a mandatory ten-day sentence.36 Accordingly, once the court
had discharged its duties by finding the facts and ascertaining the defen-
dant's guilt, the legislature sought to impose a sentence without the
interference of the trial judge's discretion. Unbridled judicial discretion
has long been criticized for its arbitrary nature, lack of adequate stan-
dards, and the glaring disparity of sentences within the maximum and
minimum range of penalties for virtually the same criminal acts. As one
legal writer explained:
Disparity without a rational basis not only offends principles ofjustice,
but may have an inhibiting effect on the treatment phase of criminal
administration as well. Prisoner morale bears a vital relationship to
prisoner response to the rehabilitative process and may be adversely
affected if the offender believes that his sentence is the product of the
230 HARV. L. REv. 369, 371 (1917).
9In discussing the lot of a petitioner who had been convicted of mail fraud and placed on
probation for two years, the United States Supreme Court noted:
Petitioner stands a convicted felon and unless the judgment against him is vacated
or reversed he is subject to all the disabilities flowing from such a judgment. The record
discloses that petitioner is a lawyer and by reason of his conviction his license was subject
to revocation (and petitioner says that he has been disbarred) without inquiry into his
guilt or innocence.
Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 213 (1937). See also People ex rel. Forsyth v. Court of
Sessions, 141 N.Y. 288, 294-95, 36 N.E. 386, 388 (1894).
'See, e.g., Exparte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42 (1916); Mack v. State, 203 Ind. 355, 368,
180 N.E. 279, 283 (1932); State v. Meyer, 228 Minn. 286, 37 N.W.2d 3 (1949); Woods v. State,
130 Tenn. 100, 169 S.W. 558 (1914).
'ALI-ABA JOINT COMM. ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., supra note 14, at 61.
'Furthermore, the statute provided that the ten-day sentence could be served over a six-week
period in one-day segments. IDAHO CODE § 49-1102(d) (Supp. 1971).
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prejudices or idiosyncrasies of a particular judge.7
However, the court noted that the specific wording of the statute in
effect deprived the court, an equal branch of government, of adequately
pperforming its function-the administration of justice."
Whenever a court invalidates a state statute, it must exercise great
caution in overruling the collective will of the legislature and upsetting
the system of law enforcement. 9 The power to interpret statutes and
to declare acts unconstitutional is in effect the ultimate veto power.4
The very core of the separation of powers is that the legislature should
not have the power to determine the conclusiveness of its own deci-
sions. Clearly, a state needs independent courts as a check upon
usurped or arbitrary power. In trying to set the automatic sentence
without ever hearing the merits of the controversy, the legislature is not
acting impartially as a judge but is seeking a declared purpose. 42 Moreo-
ver, many leading authorities consider complete separation of powers
too impractical for the efficient day-to-day operation of government.43
The argument that the suspended sentence infringes upon the executive
pardon and the legislative right to affix maximum and minimum penal-
ties overlooks the necessary and desirable results of friction between the
different branches of government. As Justice Brandeis commented con-
cerning the separation of powers in the federal system,
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Conven-
tion of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of
arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means
of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmen-
tal powers among three departments, to save the people from autoc-
racy."
3Comment, Appellate Review of Primary Sentencing Decisions: A Connecticut Case Study,
69 YALE L.J. 1453, 1459 (1960). See also ALI-ABA JOINT COMM. ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC.,
supra note 14, at 64-77 for an engrossing discussion of the disparities of sentencing and the wide
divergence in penalties meted out by judges within the same state.
-194 Idaho at - 486 P.2d at 251-52.
21As dissenting Justice McFadden points out, all reasonable doubts are resolved in favor of
the act's constitutionality, and if the statute is subject to two interpretations, the one upholding its
validity should be adopted. Id. at _ , 486 P.2d at 252.
40Fairlie, The Separation of Powers, 21 MICH. L. REv. 393, 403 (1923).
"Pound, The Judicial Power, 35 HARV. L. REv. 787, 791 (1922).
"Cf. id. at 792.
4These are extensively noted in Fairlie, supra note 40, at 405-31.
"Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (dissenting opinion).
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Furthermore, the legislature necessarily rules by fiat in broad,
sweeping terms, while the courts are particularly suited for case-by-case
adjudication. In deciding that identical sentences are not constitution-
ally required for punishing two persons convicted of the same offense,
the United States Supreme Court acknowledged the role of judicial
discretion in our system: "Sentencing judges are vested with a wide
discretion in the exceedingly difficult task of determining the appropri-
ate punishment in the countless variety of situations that appear."45
Considering the large number of offenders he deals with, a judge famil-
iar with the aims of penology is a professional sentencer.40 Rather than
being the blind dispenser of justice, the judge is in a position to weigh
the interests of society and the merits of the particular offender. He
should be free to view each crime as unique and to weigh factors like
the defendant's prior history, the nature of the crime (whether physical
harm was involved), the likelihood of his committing other crimes,
whether he can compensate the state or victim, and the probable effect
of prison on this defendant. 7 Conversely, the judge is also well-suited
to deny suspended sentence when society's interest requires it or when
reformation and rehabilitation seem remote. Also, the judge must be
free to exercise discretion in the case with extenuating circumstances;
for example, the Idaho drunk-driving statute makes no exception for the
situation in which an emergency compels an inebriated person to drive."
Unlike the Idaho situation, the North Carolina legislature has not
attempted to curtail the courts' power to suspend sentences by a man-
datory sentence without regard to judicial discretion. Moreover, despite
some very early rulings against the practice," the North Carolina Su-
preme Court has long upheld the suspended sentence as valid."0 The
power to delay imposing sentence as well as the power to suspend execu-
tion of a sentence already pronounced are considered inherent powers
of the North Carolina judiciary.5 Also, the practice has been expressly
"Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243 (1970).
"See Note, Criminal Procedure-Capital Sentencing by a Standardless Jury, 50 N.C.L. REv.
118, 121 & n.22 (1971).
7See ALI-ABA JOINT COMM. ON CONTINUING LEGAL Educ., supra note 14, at 61-62.
4894 Idaho at . 486 P.2d at 251.
49E.g., State v. Bennett, 20 N.C. 170 (1838).
wState v. Crook, 115 N.C. 760, 20 S.E. 513 (1894). See also Coates, Punishment for Crime
in North Carolina, 17 N.C.L. REv. 205, 215 (1939).
"12 N.C.L. REV. 50 (1923). For an invaluable survey of the particulars and peculiarities of
North Carolina's suspended sentence powers, see Note, Criminal Law-Suspension of Sentence,
31 N.C.L. REV. 195 (1953).
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recognized by statute except where the crime is punishable by death or
life imprisonment." Ordinarily, the defendant's express or implied con-
sent is required, but if he accepts the conditions of suspension, he waives
the right to appeal the issue of his guilt or innocence, although he can
appeal the reasonableness of the conditions.53 The reasoning here is that
suspending the imposition of sentence is in the defendant's own behalf,
and if the fails to object, he tacitly agrees to the conditions of the
suspension.54
One reasonable limitation recognized by North Carolina statute
and case law is that the terms of suspension can run no longer than five
years.5 The most common condition is suspension upon good behavior
or conduct conforming to the law.5 Although the statute sets out some
guidelines for conditions-such as avoiding disreputable persons, re-
porting to the probation officer, and supporting one's dependents-it
expressly permits "any other. ' 57 Furthermore, the North Carolina Su-
preme Court has ruled that the probation statute and its procedures are
not binding upon the court's inherent power but rather are concurrent
with the court's power.58
In practice, North Carolina's system is quite laudable. The judge
is given broad discretion in deciding whether to grant suspension and
in choosing the appropriate conditions. Exercised with prudence, the
judge has a valuable corrective device to give minor offenders an oppor-
tunity at rehabilitation and reformation. Arguably, the relative leniency
of a suspended sentence may give offenders the mistaken impression
that criminal sanctions are easily averted, thereby lessening any hopes
of rehabilitation. But this is precisely where the judge's discretion should
operate. As a professional sentencer who has dealt with many different
offenders, the judge is in the ideal position to weigh all of the factors of
this particular crime with its own circumstances and the possibility of
its recurrence. In effect, the suspended sentence can be an incentive
toward defendant's good behavior in the future. 9
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-197 (1965).
"State v. Griffin, 246 N.C. 680, 682, 100 S.E.2d 49, 51 (1957).
"State v. Miller, 225 N.C. 213, 215, 34 S.E.2d 143, 145 (1945).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-200 (Supp. 1971).
5Note, 31 N.C.L. REV., supra note 51, at 200.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-199 (1965).
"State v. Simmington, 235 N.C. 612, 614, 70 S.E.2d 842, 844 (1952).
"30 HARv. L. REv. 369, 371 (1917). The suspended sentence is especially useful where the
minimum penalty under the statute is disproportionate to the criminality involved.
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Perhaps the whole issue appears moot since most state legislatures
have either expressly given their courts the power by statute or impliedly
given it under a probation system."° On the contrary, if the power to
suspend sentence upon good behavior or to place the defendant on
pprobation depends upon the legislature, then the legislature can summa-
rily take it away. If the legislature is allowed to set automatic, manda-
tory sentences without regard to judicial discretion or extenuating cir-
cumstances, then the judge is reduced to the machine-like state of read-
ing out carbon copy sentences based not upon the merits of the particu-
lar case but upon a bare minimal finding of facts. The Idaho Supreme
Court surmised, "A judge is more than just a finder of fact or an
executioner of the inexorable rule of law. Ideally, he is also the keeper
of the conscience of the law."'
THOMAS JOSEPH FARRIS
'J. WAITE, supra note 14, at 95-105.
"194 Idaho at - 486 P.2d at 251.
[Vol. 51!
